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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 From its rather humble beginnings as a limited evidentiary pre-
sumption designed merely to shift the burden of proof in medical neg-
ligence actions and place the parties on an equal footing where a 
health care provider had failed to keep statutorily required records,1 
                                                                                                                    
 * B.A. 1973, Duke University; J.D. 1976, University of Miami School of Law; Asso-
ciate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review. Partner at McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz & 
Cartaya, P.A., of Miami, Florida. 
 1. See, e.g., Valcin v. Pub. Health Trust, 473 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), aff’d in 
part, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987). 
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the doctrine of spoliation2 of evidence in Florida has rapidly grown 
into a separate cause of action. Although experience has clearly 
shown the need for remedies to combat the spoliation of evidence un-
der certain well-defined circumstances, the unchecked progression of 
spoliation remedies potentially threatens litigants’ constitutional 
rights to due process, trial by jury, and the lawful use of their prop-
erty. A number of recent cases in Florida have appeared on their 
faces to further expand this doctrine to situations where there is no 
statutory, contractual, or other specific legal duty to preserve the 
evidence, and where the destruction or loss occurs without intent, ill 
will, or bad faith.3 Ironically, the California courts, which gave birth 
to the spoliation principles in the mid-1980s, have now withdrawn 
recognition of a separate cause of action after carefully reexamining 
both its necessity and its effects.4  
 While early experience in this field has generally centered around 
claims of spoliation of evidence asserted by plaintiffs, more recent de-
cisions have applied its principles equally to defendants, particularly 
in cases involving claims of defective or malfunctioning products.5 
Therefore, both plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in ensur-
ing that spoliation of evidence rules are not misused or misapplied by 
the removal of the limitations and safeguards originally imposed by 
the Florida Supreme Court,6 thereby resulting in an unintended ab-
rogation of the fundamental constitutional rights of trial by jury and 
due process of law. 
II.   ORIGINS OF FLORIDA’S SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE RULES 
A.   Early Cases 
 Although courts have traditionally had the power to punish par-
ties who have violated their discovery orders,7 the origin of modern 
spoliation of evidence principles in Florida dates back only to the 
early 1980s. In DePuy, Inc. v. Eckes,8 the Third District Court of Ap-
peal upheld the entry of a default judgment against a manufacturer 
of a hip prosthesis that allegedly had failed. After the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                    
 2. Practitioners and judges often spell the word incorrectly.  Although “spoilation” 
seems intuitively correct, it is spelled “spoliation.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 
1999).  
 3. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th. DCA 
2001); St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sponco Mfg. v. 
Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  
 4. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 5. See, e.g., Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Torres v. Mat-
sushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); DeLong v. A-Top Air Condition-
ing Co., 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also infra Part II.D. 
 6. Valcin, 473 So. 2d at 1305-06 (citing Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983)). 
 7. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37; FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.380. 
 8. 427 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). 
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transferred the hip prosthesis to the manufacturer’s attorneys for in-
spection (pursuant to a court order directing them to preserve the 
evidence intact), the defendant’s expert lost a critical portion of the 
prosthesis.9 
 Because the plaintiff ’s  experts testified that they were unable to 
render an opinion without actually inspecting the missing piece of 
the prosthesis, the court concluded that the plaintiff had been irrepa-
rably prejudiced and entered an order of default. The order was 
based on the provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.380(b)(2)(C), which provides: 
 (2) If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a 
party or a person designated under rule 1.310(b)(6) or 1.320(a) to 
testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or per-
mit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of 
this rule or rule 1.360, the court in which the action is pending 
may make any of the following orders: 
 . . . . 
 (c) An order striking out pleadings or parts of them or staying 
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the ac-
tion or proceeding or any part of it, or rendering a judgment by de-
fault against the disobedient party. 
In awarding these sanctions, the court further concluded that it was 
irrelevant whether the prosthesis had been lost intentionally or acci-
dentally, since the defendant’s loss of the device violated the trial 
court’s order and resulted in irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff.10 
B.   Valcin and Bondu: Missing Records 
 The following year, the Third District dealt with another type of 
“missing” evidence in Valcin v. Public Health Trust,11 which involved 
a medical malpractice action against a county-owned hospital for the 
alleged negligent performance of surgery. There, the surgeon failed to 
prepare an operative note describing the surgery in question, despite 
a statutory duty to maintain such a record. As a result of the absence 
of the required record, the plaintiff ’s  experts testified that they were 
unable to conclude whether the surgeon violated the appropriate 
standard of care during the performance of the surgery. Accordingly, 
the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment.12 
 In an effort to level the playing field between the parties, the 
Third District held that where a health care provider failed to pre-
                                                                                                                    
 9. Id. at 307.  
 10. Id. at 308. 
 11. 473 So. 2d 1297. 
 12. Id.  
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pare or maintain a record required by statute or administrative rule, 
thereby hindering the plaintiff ’s  ability to prove its case, the trial 
court should utilize one of two evidentiary presumptions.13 If the fail-
ure on the health care provider’s part was intentional, the district 
court held that this would create an irrebuttable presumption of the 
defendant’s negligence.14 If, however, the failure was due to negli-
gence or inadvertence, the court should instead use a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence.15 
 Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court modified the rule set 
down by the Third District, concluding that the use of an irrebuttable 
presumption, even where the failure to keep or maintain the records 
was intentional, would constitute a violation of the defendant’s right 
to due process as well as an improper abrogation of the jury’s func-
tion.16 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the use of a rebuttable 
presumption was not only constitutionally proper but also consistent 
with the provisions of the Florida Evidence Code.17 
 For this rebuttable presumption to arise, the Supreme Court held 
that the following conditions must first exist: (1) the health care pro-
vider must fail to prepare records required by statute or administra-
tive code; (2) the absence of the records must prevent the plaintiff 
from establishing a prima facie case; and (3) the information con-
tained in the records must be peculiarly within the knowledge of the 
health care provider.18 This is the only opinion to date rendered by 
the Florida Supreme Court directly addressing the legal require-
ments for spoliation of evidence claims. 
 Shortly after its decision in Valcin, the Third District was once 
again faced with the issue of “missing” hospital records in Bondu v. 
Gurvich.19 Although this case involved a similar failure to prepare re-
cords required to be maintained by statute, it arrived at the court in 
a much different procedural posture. Valcin involved the granting of 
a motion for summary judgment in favor of the health care provider 
based upon the inability of the plaintiff ’s  expert to render an opinion 
on the issue of negligence due to the lost records. However, in Bondu, 
the plaintiff had actually included two counts in her complaint seek-
ing to recover damages for a cause of action based upon the spolia-
tion of evidence.20 After these counts had been dismissed with preju-
                                                                                                                    
 13. Id. at 1306.  
 14. Id. at 1307.  
 15. Id. 
 16. Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987). 
 17. See FLA. STAT. § 90.302 (1985). 
 18. Valcin, 507 So. 2d at 599-600.  
 19. 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). 
 20. Id. at 1310.  
2002]                          SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 1293 
 
dice, the plaintiff filed a separate action, once again asserting her 
spoliation-based claims, which were also dismissed.21 
 In analyzing the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff ’s  com-
plaint, a divided panel of the Third District concluded that the three 
essential elements of any tort action were present: “(1) the existence 
of a duty recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to a 
certain standard of conduct . . . ; (2) a[n] [alleged] failure on the part 
of the defendant to perform that duty; and (3) an injury or damage to 
the plaintiff proximately [resulting from] such failure.”22 The exis-
tence of a legal duty—in this case supplied by an administrative 
regulation, coupled with a Florida Statute requiring the creation and 
maintenance of the records—was emphasized by the court: “We rec-
ognize, of course, no such action can lie unless, in Prosser’s words, it 
is ‘clear that the plaintiff ’s  interests are entitled to legal protection 
against the conduct of the defendant[s],’ that is, there is a [legal] 
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant which the law recog-
nizes.”23 While noting that such a tort was “not a familiar one,”24 the 
majority quoted Professor Prosser’s prior observation: 
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the 
progress of the common law is marked by many cases of first im-
pression, in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new 
cause of action, where none has been recognized before . . . . The 
law of torts is anything but static, and the limits of its develop-
ment are never set.25 
 The majority also relied on the decisions of several California in-
termediate appellate courts, which had previously recognized a cause 
of action based upon the spoliation of evidence involving nonparties.26 
The Third District concluded that if such a cause of action existed 
against a third party who had no connection to the lost prospective 
litigation, then such an action should even more logically lie against 
a defendant who stood to benefit by the fact that the “prospect of suc-
cessful litigation against it has disappeared along with the crucial 
evidence.”27 
 Chief Justice Schwartz, in an often cited dissent, argued against 
the recognition of this new tort on the grounds that: 
                                                                                                                    
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1312.   
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.   
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding 
automobile dealer liable for subsequent destruction of van entrusted to it by plaintiff’s 
counsel, thereby preventing suit against dealer for plaintiff’s personal injuries following 
accident). 
 27. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1312. 
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[S]uch a rule runs counter to the basic principle that there is no 
cognizable independent action for perjury, or for any improper 
conduct even by a witness, much less by a party, in an existing 
lawsuit. Were the rule otherwise, every case would be subject to 
constant retrials in the guise of independent actions. Thus, what 
the court characterizes . . . as an “a fortiori” situation is instead a 
complete non-sequitur.28 
Accordingly, Chief Justice Schwartz concluded that any action neces-
sary to remedy a spoliation of evidence should be limited to the tak-
ing of appropriate remedial measures in the underlying main action, 
to cases in which a judgment has already been entered in a Rule 
1.540 motion, or to an action to set aside the judgment consistent 
with the limitations inherent in such remedies.29 
 Despite the recognition of a separate cause of action for spoliation 
of evidence in Bondu, Florida appellate decisions throughout the re-
mainder of the 1980s largely relied upon the remedies provided by 
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or the Florida Evidence Code to 
deal with issues involving lost or missing evidence. Typical of these 
cases was the Third District’s opinion in Rockwell International 
Corp. v. Menzies.30 In Rockwell, the court upheld the striking of a 
manufacturer’s pleadings and the entry of a default judgment 
against the manufacturer in a products liability action, where the 
manufacturer had inadvertently lost a portion of the product after it 
had been turned over to it for inspection pursuant to a trial court or-
der and a written agreement prohibiting its alteration or destruc-
tion.31 In upholding the sanctions, the Third District relied upon the 
existence of the trial court order and a written agreement to find a 
duty to preserve the evidence, so that the fact that it was lost made 
the manufacturer’s lack of bad faith irrelevant.32 
 A resort to Rule 1.380 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was 
also utilized in the highly unusual case of Hammer v. Rosenthal Jew-
elers Supply Corp.,33 which demonstrates the unpredictable situa-
tions in which spoliation of evidence principles can arise. In Ham-
mer, the court held that the plaintiff ’s  lawsuit arising out of his al-
leged contraction of lung cancer could be dismissed as a sanction for 
failure to comply with discovery where the decedent’s surviving wife 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Id. at 1314 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Schwartz’s rationale subsequently 
formed a substantial portion of the reasoning adopted by the California Supreme Court 
fourteen years later in overruling the numerous California intermediate appellate deci-
sions, which had continued to recognize the new tort of spoliation of evidence. See Cedars-
Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 29. Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1314.  
 30. 561 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 31. Id. at 679.  
 32. Id. 
 33. 558 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). 
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refused to give permission to the defendant to exhume her husband’s 
body because of her religious objections.34 Despite the validity of the 
objections, the Fourth District upheld the lower court’s action be-
cause of the defendant’s need to perform an autopsy in order to re-
spond to the plaintiff ’s  allegations of negligence.35 
C.   The 1990s 
 After nearly a decade of dormancy following its recognition in Val-
cin, the cause of action for spoliation of evidence began to receive re-
newed attention in 1990. The Third District Court of Appeal was 
faced with two suits seeking recovery against uninsured motorist 
carriers that had lost damaged vehicles entrusted to them by their 
insureds. The plaintiffs contended that the vehicles were necessary 
to prosecute subsequent tort actions arising out of the underlying ac-
cidents. 
 In Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co.,36 the basis of the plaintiff ’s  
suit was an oral agreement by the uninsured motorist insurer to pre-
serve the vehicle following the conclusion of the uninsured motorist 
claim, so that the plaintiff could pursue a products liability suit 
against its manufacturer for a claimed defect that had contributed to 
causing the accident. As a result of the accidental destruction of the 
vehicle, the plaintiff ’s  expert testified that while he “believed” a de-
fect had caused the accident, he would be unable to actually testify at 
trial on this issue because he had been deprived of the opportunity to 
inspect the vehicle.37 
 The trial judge directed a verdict in the insurer’s favor on the 
separate grounds that: (1) “Florida law does not recognize a cause of 
action [for breach of contract] based on the denial of an opportunity 
to prove a products liability case” and (2) because Florida products 
liability law gives rise to a presumption that a product is defective 
where it subsequently destroyed itself by a malfunction, the plaintiff 
would be unable to establish that she had suffered irreparable harm 
by the insurer’s actions in losing the vehicle.38 In reversing the trial 
court’s action, the Third District quickly disposed of the second 
ground of the lower court’s decision by noting that the presumption 
of a defect only applies where the product destroys itself, not where it 
is destroyed by a third party.39 The Third District next turned its at-
tention to the more difficult issue of whether a cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence could be based upon contract. First, the court 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Id. at 461.  
 35. Id.  
 36. 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 37. Id. at 26. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 30.  
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noted that a number of courts in other jurisdictions had recognized 
such a cause of action based upon negligence where all of the tradi-
tional tort elements were present.40 Concluding that there was no le-
gal difference between whether the duty to preserve the evidence 
arose by contract or by operation of law, the Third District went on to 
hold that there was therefore no reason to limit claims for spoliation 
of evidence to tort actions.41 
 In reaching this conclusion, the Third District focused on the simi-
larities between the duty to preserve evidence and whether the duty 
arises in the tort or the contract context, while discounting the sig-
nificance of the dissimilarities between each such remedy, particu-
larly as they related to the issue of damages. The court noted that 
damages in contract actions normally must be established within a 
reasonable degree of certainty, which would be lacking where the 
underlying personal injury action had not been finally disposed of 
against the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court determined that an eq-
uitable exception to this doctrine would apply so as to impose any 
risk of uncertainty upon the defendant, because he had created the 
situation. Therefore, the court concluded that a cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence could be maintained in either contract or tort, 
as long as a duty to preserve the evidence existed.42 
 The second case, Continental Insurance Co. v. Herman,43 sought to 
define the degree of “impairment” to the plaintiff ’s  underlying claim, 
which was necessary to support such a cause of action, caused by the 
destruction of the evidence. The damaged vehicle was entrusted to 
the agents of the uninsured motorist carrier who, like the carrier’s 
agents in Miller, inadvertently destroyed it. Despite the loss of the 
vehicle, however, the plaintiff ’s  liability experts nevertheless were 
able to testify in the underlying litigation based upon photographs of 
the damage.44 As a result, the plaintiff prevailed at arbitration, re-
ceiving a $4.3 million damage award, which was reduced by her 
eighty percent comparative negligence, to a net award of $860,000.45 
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a suit for destruction of the car con-
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. at 26; see also Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 454 (Alaska 
1986); Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). As previously 
noted, however, Smith recently was reversed in Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 
954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 41. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27. A similar result was also subsequently reached in Brown 
v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which a cause of action for 
spoliation of evidence was upheld against a city’s police department. The police department 
had allegedly promised to retain a vehicle (purported to be involved in an accident with the 
plaintiff) following the completion of its criminal investigation. However, the police de-
partment thereafter disposed of it, precluding the plaintiff from pursuing his case. 
 42. Miller, 573 So. 2d at 27.  
 43. 576 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 44. Id. at 314.  
 45. Id.  
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tending that her ability to present her uninsured motorist claim was 
“hindered” by the absence of the vehicle itself, resulting in the high 
comparative negligence finding. In this case, the jury found the 
plaintiff “only” sixty-five percent at fault for causing the accident 
based upon several evidentiary presumptions designed to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the loss of her vehicle.46 
 In overturning the jury’s verdict, the Third District rejected the 
plaintiff ’s  argument that she need only establish that she was “hin-
dered” in presenting her case by the lost evidence. Instead, the court 
held that the plaintiff must establish that she suffered “a significant 
impairment” in her ability to prove her underlying case.47 On rehear-
ing, the court further observed that while the question of whether an 
impairment was “significant” was ordinarily a question of fact, in 
light of the extent of the plaintiff ’s  recovery in her underlying arbi-
tration, reasonable persons could not differ that there had been a 
lack of a significant impairment in this particular case.48 
D.   Application to Defendants 
 The seeds for the application of spoliation of evidence principles to 
defendants were sown in 1990 by the Fourth District in Hammer v. 
Rosenthal Jewelers Supply Corp. In Hammer, the Fourth District 
held that the plaintiff ’s  lawsuit for wrongful death could be dis-
missed as a sanction for the failure to comply with discovery unless 
the decedent’s surviving wife gave permission to exhume the dece-
dent’s body and to allow an autopsy.49 
 Nearly a decade later, the Third District removed any doubt that 
spoliation of evidence principles would apply equally to the benefit of 
defendants in DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co.50 The court also 
reiterated the principle that the party’s intent was not critical, as it 
expressly observed that the plaintiff had “inadvertently lost or mis-
placed” the critical evidence.51 
 Florida’s recognition of a defense based upon spoliation of evi-
dence is consistent with the holdings in many jurisdictions, particu-
larly in products liability actions where the allegedly defective prod-
                                                                                                                    
 46. Id. at 315. “The two presumptions the jury was instructed to apply were: (1) that 
[the plaintiff’s] brakes failed prior to the accident, and (2) that [the plaintiff’s] vehicle 
would have cleared the intersection [but for the uninsured vehicle’s] excessive speed.” Id. 
at 315 n.1. The propriety of these presumptions was not challenged on appeal. 
 47. Id. at 315.   
 48. Id. at 316.  
 49. 558 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).   
 50. 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); see also Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 
So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 
 51. DeLong, 710 So. 2d at 707. 
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uct is disposed of prior to suit.52 These cases generally have been 
based upon the rationale that “products liability case[s] foc[us] on the 
product itself,” and as such usually “involve competing expert testi-
mony [for] juries [to] evaluate.”53  
 Courts have also expressed concern over the potential for fraud 
inherent in these situations: 
To permit claims of defective products where a purchaser of the 
product has simply thrown it away after an accident, would both 
encourage false claims and make legitimate defense of valid claims 
more difficult. It would put a plaintiff (or plaintiff ’s  attorney) in 
the position of deciding whether the availability of the item would 
help or hurt his or her case. Where producing the product for de-
fense inspection would weaken rather than strengthen a case, we 
unfortunately are obliged to conclude that some plaintiffs and at-
torneys would be unable to resist the temptation to have the prod-
uct disappear.54 
As a result, where the defendant is unable to examine the allegedly 
defective product, these cases have generally concluded that the de-
fendant would be unduly prejudiced in having to defend against the 
plaintiff ’s  claims.55 
 Although generally involved in products liability cases, the de-
fense of spoliation has also been applied to a variety of other types of 
cases as well, including medical malpractice,56 maritime,57 and 
antitrust.58 
                                                                                                                    
 52. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (involving 
maritime case in which plaintiff’s expert conducted destructive testing on vessel’s engine); 
Glover v. Bic Corp., 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993); Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660 
(M.D. Pa. 1993) (dismissing suit under Pennsylvania law based upon an alleged defect in 
truck owned by plaintiff’s employer where employer repaired allegedly defective part); Lee 
v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (entering 
summary judgment against plaintiff where counsel lost can of drain cleaner that allegedly 
exploded and injured plaintiff, even where samples of contents had been provided to defen-
dants for testing prior to loss of can); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 
160 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (involving destruction of product by plaintiff’s expert); Headley v. 
Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991); Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 
A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996); Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Stubli v. Big D 
Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991); Roselli v. Gen. Elec. Co., 599 A.2d 685 (Pa. 
1991) (entering summary judgment against plaintiff claiming injury by defective coffee ca-
rafe that exploded in her hand where fragments were thrown away).  
 53. Sipe, 837 F. Supp. at 661. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979) (involving destruction of body 
in autopsy performed by plaintiff’s expert following exhumation of body for litigation pur-
poses). 
 57. Vodusek, 71 F.3d 148. 
 58. Alexander v. Nat’l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving an 
antitrust action where plaintiff destroyed documents of allegedly illegal campaign contri-
butions). 
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 Another case demonstrating the almost limitless potential for the 
imaginative application of spoliation remedies is Vega v. CSCS In-
ternational.59 In Vega, the defendant successfully argued in the trial 
court that the plaintiff ’s  decision to undergo nonemergency surgery 
to remove a herniated lumbar disc without first providing an oppor-
tunity to be examined by another doctor constituted spoliation of evi-
dence—the evidence in this case consisting of the plaintiff ’s  lumbar 
disc. Although the Third District subsequently reversed the trial 
court’s application of spoliation principles, it held that the court 
would have had the authority to sanction the plaintiff if the defen-
dant had first filed a formal request for an independent medical ex-
amination under Rule 1.360 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Such a request, the court concluded, would have imposed a duty upon 
the plaintiff to postpone the surgery in order to allow the examina-
tion to go forward.  
 As with claims advanced by plaintiffs, courts in different jurisdic-
tions have applied spoliation principles in favor of defendants in a 
variety of different ways. Some courts have dismissed plaintiff ’s  
claims60 or recognized spoliation as an affirmative defense entitling a 
defendant to a verdict in its favor,61 while others have treated spolia-
tion as merely giving rise to a presumption in the defendant’s favor.62 
Still other courts have treated spoliation as a rule of evidence that is 
not even required to be pleaded in advance of the trial.63 Some courts 
have merely limited the proof that the plaintiff will be allowed to 
produce in an effort to cure the prejudice caused by the missing evi-
dence.64 
 Courts applying spoliation principles in favor of defendants have 
also recognized differing rules for its application. Some courts have 
required a showing of bad faith65 and others some degree of negli-
gence.66 Still other courts have applied spoliation principles without 
either bad faith or negligence.67 
 As with the recognition of a cause of action based upon spoliation 
in favor of plaintiffs, the actual application of spoliation defenses has 
                                                                                                                    
 59. 795 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).   
 60. See, e.g., Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).  
 61. See, e.g., Sipe v. Ford Motor Co., 837 F. Supp. 660, 661 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Lee v. 
Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1992). 
 62. See, e.g., Alexander, 687 F.2d at 1173; Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 545 (W.D. 
Okla. 1979). 
 63. See, e.g., Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 64. See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991); 
Barker, 85 F.R.D. at 545 (excluding plaintiff’s expert from testifying at trial where plain-
tiff’s expert conducted destructive testing of allegedly defective automobile parts). 
 65. See, e.g., Gentry v. Toyota Motor Corp., 471 S.E.2d 485 (Va. 1996).  
 66. See, e.g., Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maint. Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1985).  
 67. See, e.g., Vodusek 71 F.3d at 155-56. 
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often been somewhat arbitrary and unnecessary. For example, some 
courts have dismissed products liability cases based upon spoliation 
even where the plaintiff ’s  claims relate to a design defect rather 
than a manufacturing one, so that the absence of the specific product 
would not be determinative to either party’s burden of proof.68 
 The determination of the parameters of the duty to retain a prod-
uct or other potential evidence poses equally difficult practical prob-
lems in the application of spoliation principles to the actions of plain-
tiffs as it does to conduct by defendants. A good example of the scope 
of these problems can been seen in Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric 
Tool Corp.,69 which involved a products liability suit against the 
manufacturer of a circular saw for injuries sustained due to a pur-
ported design defect. The plaintiff claimed the defect allowed parti-
cles to improperly collect in the guard mechanism thereby preventing 
it from working. 
 Following the incident, plaintiff ’s  counsel retained an expert in 
order to determine why the accident occurred and if there was a 
product defect. The expert was required to disassemble the saw, dur-
ing which process particles trapped in the guard mechanism fell out. 
The expert took photographs of the saw both before and after disas-
sembly and then, after suit was filed, eventually forwarded the dis-
assembled pieces to the manufacturer’s expert witness. Subse-
quently, the trial court struck the plaintiff ’s  expert witness for alter-
ing the evidence by allowing the trapped particles to fall out during 
the inspection.70 
 In reversing the trial court’s sanctions, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that the expert did not destroy the product but merely 
disassembled it in order to make the determination of whether the 
plaintiff had a meritorious case in the first instance.71 Moreover, be-
cause of the nature of the defect, any handling of the saw as a practi-
cal matter would alter its condition to some degree. Therefore, the 
court reasoned that the only way to have avoided any alteration of 
the saw would have been for the plaintiff to identify all potential de-
fendants to the controversy before suit was filed or an expert opinion 
reached as to the cause of the accident, and to invite each such po-
tential defendant to participate in the inspection of the saw.72 
Because this would have placed the plaintiff in an impossible “Catch 
                                                                                                                    
 68. See, e.g., Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Prods., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Pa. 
1992). But see Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 69. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 78. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 79.  
 72. Id. at 81.   
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22” situation, the court concluded that application of spoliation prin-
ciples was unwarranted.73 
E.   Claims Against Third Parties 
 The typical spoliation of evidence case based upon the actions of 
third parties who are not actual litigants in the underlying litigation 
generally involves experts,74 attorneys,75 insurance companies,76 em-
ployers,77 or other agents of the parties.78 Actions have also been rec-
ognized, however, against individuals and entities totally unrelated 
to the pending litigation and parties. 
 In Brown v. City of Delray Beach,79 a cause of action was upheld 
against a local police department for negligently disposing of evi-
dence collected during its investigation into a hit and run accident, 
where proof was presented that the plaintiff ’s  counsel had requested 
access to the evidence while in the possession of the police. Despite 
assurances from the department that the evidence would be pre-
served and subsequently made available following the completion of 
their investigation, it was destroyed. In recognizing a claim for spo-
liation under these circumstances, the court focused on the existence 
of a duty to preserve the evidence created by the express promise of 
the police to maintain the evidence for the benefit of the plaintiff.80 
 In the absence of such an express promise, however, there is gen-
erally no duty to assist a plaintiff in investigating a potential claim. 
As a result of the lack of such a duty, a spoliation claim asserted 
against a ship owner by an alleged rape victim for failing to assist 
her in the investigation of her incident was dismissed in Doe v. Ce-
lebrity Cruises.81  
 Another unusual application of the cause of action for spoliation 
occurred in Velasco v. Commercial Building Maintenance Co.,82 in 
                                                                                                                    
 73. Id. While it may have been impossible to determine the identity of all defendants 
to the case, it certainly would have been possible to advise the manufacturer of the intent 
to disassemble the saw and invite the manufacturer’s participation. 
 74. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992); 
Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 75. E.g., Torres v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 762 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).  
 76. E.g., Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. at 161; Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Vill. Pontiac GMC, Inc., 
585 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). 
 77. E.g., Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995). 
 78. E.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
 79. 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); see also Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 
1983). 
 80. See Brown, 652 So. 2d at 1153.  
 81. 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337, (S.D. Fla. 2001). Doe can also be found at 2001 AMC 2672 
(S.D. Fla. 2001). But see De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986) (permitting claim by passenger against bus driver for failure to obtain iden-
tity of truck causing collision).   
 82. 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
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which the plaintiff sued a building maintenance company for inad-
vertently throwing away bottle fragments left by his attorney in an 
unmarked paper bag on his desk. Although recognizing that such a 
cause of action could be stated under certain circumstances, the court 
held that the maintenance company could not have been found negli-
gent as a matter of law in this case, because the bag was unmarked 
and appeared to be garbage.83 The real crux of the court’s holding, 
however, appears more to reflect an unwillingness to extend the 
cause of action for spoliation when dealing with unrelated third par-
ties to the same lengths as when parties to the litigation are in-
volved. 
F.   Insurance Coverage for Spoliation Claims 
 After initially concluding that insurance coverage existed for spo-
liation claims under liability policies, recent cases have taken dia-
metrically opposed positions on this issue. In DiGiulio v. Prudential 
Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,84 the first Florida case to con-
sider the issue, the Fourth District concluded that coverage existed 
for a spoliation claim under a homeowner’s insurance policy. The 
case began when a young child was injured in a boating accident. The 
parents immediately retained an attorney, who secured an agree-
ment from the boat owner to preserve the boat’s seat upon which the 
child had been injured. After preserving the evidence for approxi-
mately one month, the boat owner subsequently sold his craft, mis-
takenly believing that the child’s attorney had inspected and photo-
graphed the boat.85 
 The parents subsequently sued the boat owner for spoliation of 
evidence, seeking damages equal to those that they claimed they 
would have received if the evidence had not been destroyed. After the 
insurer denied coverage, the parents entered into a so-called 
“Coblentz settlement”86 with the boat owner, pursuant to a settle-
ment agreement between the parties, following which the boat owner 
assigned to the parents all of his rights under his homeowner’s pol-
icy. Thereafter, the parents brought suit directly against the insurer 
for the damages set forth in the settlement agreement. 
                                                                                                                    
 83. Id. at 506.  
 84. 710 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).  
 85. Id. at 4.  
 86. Such agreements are named after Coblentz v. Am. Surety Co., 416 F.2d 1059 (5th 
Cir. 1969), in which the court upheld a judgment entered against an insurer based upon a 
settlement between the insured and the plaintiff following the insurer’s improper denial of 
coverage. The settlement provided that the judgment could only be satisfied against the in-
surer. In the absence of fraud or collusion, the court concluded that by denying coverage, 
the insurer had waived any right to complain about the terms of the settlement. See also 
Shook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 498 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Steil v. Fla. Physicians’ Ins. 
Reciprocal, 448 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). 
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 The Fourth District reversed the trial court’s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the insurer, concluding: 
[A] prospective civil action . . . is a valuable “probable expectancy” 
that the court must protect from interference . . . . We understand 
the cause of action to be that the claimant had, as a result of the 
insured’s undertaking to preserve the evidence to allow inspection 
and photographing, an intangible and beneficial interest in the 
preservation of the evidence. It is that beneficial interest that he 
claims was lost when the insured negligently discarded the wooden 
[seat] base. Thus it was not the insured’s own interest that was af-
fected, but instead the claimant’s.87 
 Subsequently, in Norris v. Colony Insurance Co.,88 the Fourth Dis-
trict did an abrupt about-face by refusing to extend coverage under a 
general commercial liability policy to a claim of spoliation based upon 
a gas station’s erasure of a surveillance videotape in an underlying 
assault and battery claim brought by a customer. The court distin-
guished its earlier DiGiulio opinion by concluding that it had never 
addressed the issue of coverage in the first instance but only the ap-
plicability of policy exclusionary clauses.89 
 This time around, the Fourth District concluded that the spolia-
tion claim was not based upon bodily injury but instead a destruction 
of evidence. Although the purported destruction of evidence consti-
tuted a physical erasure of a videotape, the court further concluded 
that it did not constitute a “physical injury to tangible property [of 
the claimant] . . . [a]t best, the spoliation in this case had an effect 
only on an intangible, plaintiff ’s  cause of action against her assail-
ant.”90 
 After initially following Norris, the Third District reversed itself 
on rehearing en banc in Lincoln Insurance Co. v. Home Emergency 
Services, Inc.,91 in which an employee brought suit for his employer’s 
alleged failure to preserve a defective ladder causing his injuries. 
Noting that the policy recovered “damages because of ‘bodily in-
jury,’”92 the Third District concluded that the claim for spoliation was 
                                                                                                                    
 87. Digiulo, 710 So. 2d at 5 (emphasis added) (quoting St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brin-
son, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). 
 88. 760 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). 
 89. Id. at 1012.  
 90. Id. (emphasis added) (holding that the physical damage to the insured’s property 
(i.e., the videotapes) could not be considered because of a policy provision excluding cover-
age for damage to the insured’s property). 
 91. No. 3D99-1806, 2001 WL 37808 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 17, 2001), rev’d on rehearing, 
2002 Fla. L. Weekly D513 (Fla. 3d DCA March 6, 2002) (en banc). 
 92. Id. at *4. 
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properly viewed as arising “because of bodily injury” and therefore 
fell within the policy’s terms or coverage.93 
 In an earlier decision, the Third District had previously refused to 
extend liability insurance coverage arising out of a spoliation claim 
caused by the insured’s intentional destruction of evidence in Scott 
Technologies, Inc. v. Reliance Insurance Co. of Illinois.94 The court 
concluded that the insured’s intentional conduct, which the trial 
judge had characterized as “the most egregious case of discovery 
abuse this Court has ever seen”95 and that had resulted in the entry 
of a default judgment, constituted a violation of the policy’s coopera-
tion clause. 
G.   Criminal Cases 
 Somewhat incongruously, criminal cases have been much more 
restrictive in allowing spoliation of evidence claims, despite the 
state’s significantly greater burdens to preserve and produce evi-
dence than found in civil cases. For example, in State v. Erwin,96 the 
court rejected the defendant’s spoliation of evidence claim in a DUI 
manslaughter case where the police had used up one vial of blood 
removed from the defendant and then accidentally destroyed a sec-
ond one before the defense had an opportunity to test it. In reversing 
the lower court’s suppression order, the Fifth District focused upon 
the fact that because there is “no duty upon the state or its agents to 
collect two vials for analysis,” the state could not be penalized for ac-
cidentally destroying the second vial, even if it possibly contained ex-
culpatory evidence.97 
III.   THE TREND AWAY FROM REQUIRING A LEGAL DUTY 
 Although the early Florida spoliation cases made it clear that a 
legal duty to preserve the evidence in question must exist, loose lan-
guage in several subsequent Third and Fourth District opinions have 
routinely been cited for the proposition that a duty to preserve evi-
dence may arise merely because litigation is imminent or foresee-
able.98 More recent decisions, however, have shown a marked diver-
                                                                                                                    
 93. Id. The court went on to find against the plaintiff, however, concluding that a pol-
icy exclusion for work-related injuries was also applicable. 
 94. 746 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). This decision was a continuation of the ear-
lier case of Figgie Int’l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), discussed in 
Part VII. 
 95. Scott Techs., Inc., 746 So. 2d at 1137 (quoting Figgie Int’l, Inc., 698 So. 2d at 564). 
 96. 686 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). 
 97. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). As discussed infra, the court also relied upon the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), which re-
quired the defendant to establish bad faith on the part of the state in destroying evidence. 
 98. Similar language is also found in a number of spoliation cases from other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., In re Wechsler 121 F. Supp. 2d 404 (D. Del. 2000); State Farm Fire & Cas. 
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gence between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on 
this issue, with the Fourth District continuing to expand spoliation 
remedies, while the Third District has begun to retreat from the im-
plication in Sponco Manufacturing, Inc. v. Alcover99 that a duty to 
preserve evidence is created by the mere foreseeability of litigation.  
 In Alcover, the Third District upheld a spoliation of evidence claim 
against a manufacturer who had discarded the allegedly defective 
product (i.e., a ladder), despite the fact that there had been no stat-
ute, court order, or agreement requiring its retention. On its face, the 
court’s opinion failed to enunciate its rationale, but has been read at 
both the trial and appellate levels to imply the existence of a legal 
duty to preserve the product merely by virtue of the fact that a law-
suit was imminent. This, of course, would represent a quantum leap 
in the extension of spoliation of evidence principles by recognizing 
the existence of a duty based solely upon the foreseeability of possible 
litigation. 
 Such a leap came one step closer when the Fourth District subse-
quently relied upon Alcover in St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Brinson,100 
to also uphold a spoliation of evidence suit without reference to the 
existence of any statute, court order, or agreement requiring the pro-
duct’s retention. Here the plaintiff ’s  decedent, a nineteen-month-old 
child, died while under anesthesia at the defendant’s hospital. Sub-
sequently, the hospital gave the anesthesia machine back to the 
manufacturer in order to investigate whether it had malfunctioned, 
following which the manufacturer disassembled it. 
 The decedent’s survivors thereafter sued both the hospital and the 
anesthesiologist for medical negligence. After settling the case 
against the anesthesiologist for $675,000, the plaintiffs filed a sec-
ond, separate suit against the hospital for spoliation of evidence 
based upon the hospital’s surrender of the anesthetic equipment to 
its manufacturer and its subsequent disassembly. 
 Ultimately, the trial court consolidated the two actions against 
the hospital, despite its argument that the consolidation placed it in 
the “untenable position of being forced to choose between foregoing 
the statutorily created privilege for risk management material . . . in 
the underlying negligence action, or being prohibited from using in-
formation necessary to defend against the allegation of negligent spo-
                                                                                                                    
Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 
P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993); Viviano 
v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
 99. 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Compare Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, 
Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), with Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. 
Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). 
 100. 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). 
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liation of evidence.”101 During the course of the trial, the court subse-
quently entered a default against the hospital based upon its refusal 
to turn over various documents claimed to be privileged, following 
which the jury returned a verdict of $8,325,000. 
 Although citing prior Florida cases permitting a cause of action for 
negligent destruction of evidence, the Fourth District’s ensuing opin-
ion is silent on its face as to the basis of the legal duty imposed upon 
the hospital to preserve the evidence, which was held to be essential 
in earlier cases in order to give rise to such a cause of action. In fact, 
the court appeared to dispose of the duty issue by merely noting: 
[T]he Brinsons alleged that because St. Mary’s knew of the poten-
tial civil claim against the vaporizer’s manufacturer, it had a duty 
to preserve the vaporizer, and [St. Mary’s] failure to [maintain the 
same] impaired the Brinsons’ ability to prove a cause of action 
against the manufacturer and other responsible agents of the va-
porizer unit.102 
 The court added that such claims are justified on the grounds that 
“a prospective civil action . . . is a valuable ‘probable expectancy’ that 
the court must protect from interference.”103 As with Alcover, the 
Fourth District’s opinion on its face appears to imply the existence of 
such a duty merely by virtue of the fact that the decedent died during 
a surgery, thereby giving rise to the expectation that a lawsuit would 
follow. 
 Nevertheless, a review of the underlying trial court records in 
each of these cases clearly indicates that such an implied duty was 
neither found nor relied upon by the trial court, which in each case 
instead found the existence of such a duty in keeping with prior deci-
sions. In Alcover, for example, the record in the trial court clearly es-
tablished that the ladder in question was in fact disposed of years af-
ter the plaintiff ’s  lawsuit was filed.104 The trial court record further 
indicates that following the accident in September 1990, the ladder 
was turned over to its manufacturer, Sponco, by the plaintiff ’s  em-
ployer in December 1990. In August 1991, the plaintiff filed his 
products liability suit against Sponco and several other co-
defendants. After suit was filed, Sponco’s counsel agreed to make the 
ladder available for inspection; however, it later was learned that the 
ladder was inadvertently disposed of sometime in 1993.105 
                                                                                                                    
 101. Id. at 34 (citation omitted). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 35 (citation omitted). 
 104. See Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 9, Sponco Mfg, Inc. v. Alcover, 656 So. 2d 
629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (No. 94-02671). 
 105. Id. 
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 As a result of the disappearance of the ladder, the plaintiffs 
moved for the entry of a default and other sanctions, supported by 
the affidavit of an expert who stated that without the opportunity to 
actually inspect the ladder, the “plaintiffs will be unable to either go 
forward in establishing liability or to adequately respond to the de-
fendants’ assertion of comparative negligence, assumption of the 
risk, product alteration, or product abuse/misuse without this critical 
piece of physical evidence . . . .”106 The expert’s affidavit went on to 
further state that the available pictures of the ladder were insuffi-
cient to form a basis to render valid opinions regarding the ladder’s 
design or manufacturing defects.107 
 The trial court granted the plaintiff ’s  motion, specifically relying 
upon the fact that the ladder had disappeared “after suit had been 
filed,” thereby raising the court’s inherent power to sanction: 
[A] party or litigant who, as here, breaches its duty to preserve 
what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the ac-
tion, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery 
and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.108 
Although not at all apparent from the Third District’s opinion, the 
basis of the lower court’s ruling and the plaintiff ’s  argument on ap-
peal were the provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.380(b)(2)(c)109 and the court’s “inherent power to regulate litigation, 
preserve and protect the integrity of proceedings before it, and sanc-
tion parties for abusive practices.”110 
 While Florida courts had previously relied upon these authorities 
to sanction parties even in the absence of the violation of a specific 
court order,111 it is nevertheless clear that for these authorities to be 
applicable there must at least be a pending lawsuit at the time of the 
conduct in question. Therefore, although it is not at all apparent 
from the loose wording of the opinion itself, when reviewing the un-
derlying record it is clear that Alcover does not hold that a legal duty 
to preserve evidence arises merely because the filing of a lawsuit is 
foreseeable or imminent. Instead, Alcover is clearly limited to situa-
                                                                                                                    
 106. Affidavit of Vigil Flanigan, Ph.D., filed on August 4, 1994, in support of Alcover’s 
Motion for Default and Sanctions. 
 107. Id. 
 108.  Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 10, Sponco Mfg, Inc., 656 So. 2d 629 (quoting 
from trial court’s written order granting motion for default filed on Oct. 17, 1994) (empha-
sis added). 
 109. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.380(b)(2)(C) provides for the entry of “[a]n order striking out 
pleadings or parts of them . . . or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part of it, or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.” 
 110.  Answer Brief of Appellee/Plaintiff at 14, Sponco Mfg, Inc., 656 So. 2d 629 (quoting 
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 111. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Pino, 482 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). 
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tions where the evidence is lost after suit is filed, resulting in a viola-
tion of Florida’s discovery rules or the court’s inherent power to con-
trol the litigation before it.112 
 The limited nature of the holding in Alcover was further verified 
by the Third District’s more recent holding in Pennsylvania Lum-
berman’s Mutual Insurance Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,113 in 
which the court expressly refused to recognize a “common law duty” 
upon a defendant to preserve an allegedly defective piece of equip-
ment in the absence of proof that the defendant had received formal 
notice of the plaintiff ’s  intent to initiate litigation.114 In affirming the 
lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 
the Third District observed: 
Unlike the defendant in Bondu v. Gurvich, the defendant in this 
case was not under any statutory or contractual duty to maintain 
or preserve the transformer in question. To the extent that the ap-
pellant, who was the plaintiff below, argues that the defendant 
was under some type of common law duty to preserve the trans-
former in question after being notified of possible legal action 
against the defendant in connection with the transformer, we note 
that the record refutes the plaintiff ’s  contention that the defen-
dant’s legal department was notified both by a letter and a “fax” 
concerning the possible initiation of legal action and, therefore, 
should have preserved the transformer as potential evidence in 
that legal action.115 
Although the Third District did not definitely answer the question of 
whether a common law duty could arise under any set of circum-
stances, it nevertheless made it clear that at the very least, such a 
duty would require sufficient proof of the receipt of formal notice of 
an intent to initiate litigation. 
                                                                                                                    
 112. In Alcover, the Third District made it clear that it was not proceeding under the 
same rules that would be applicable to a pure spoliation of evidence cause of action. 656 So. 
2d at 630 n.1. In fact, the court’s note clearly implies that the requirements for stating a 
cause of action for spoliation would be more strenuous, by noting “[u]nder certain circum-
stances, the destruction of evidence may confer in an aggrieved party a separate cognizable 
claim.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The clear implication is that such circum-
stances did not exist in the present case. 
 113. 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). 
 114. The Third District’s retraction from Alcover is further evidenced by its even more 
recent decision in Vega v. CSCS International, 795 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), in which 
it held that in the absence of a formal request for an independent medical examination un-
der Rule 1.360, a plaintiff could not be guilty of spoliation by proceeding with surgery to 
remove a lumbar disc without first undergoing an examination by a second physician. The 
court concluded, however, that a formal request under Rule 1.360 would create a duty for 
the plaintiff to undergo such an examination before proceeding with the surgery. 
 115. Pa. Lumberman’s Mutual Ins. Co., 724 So. 2d at 630 (citations omitted); see also 
Grand Hall Enter. Co. v. Mackoul, 780 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that mere 
disassembly of a product in the absence of a court order or improper motive does not justify 
spoliation sanctions). 
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 A close inspection of the lower court record underlying Brinson116 
also clearly indicates that the claims of spoliation by the plaintiffs at 
trial were not based upon any implied common law duty arising be-
cause of the foreseeability of possible litigation. Instead, it was ar-
gued at both the trial and appellate levels117 that the hospital had a 
duty to preserve the anesthesia equipment intact by virtue of either 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act [“FDA”],118 section 395.0197, Flor-
ida Statutes,119 or Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-3.222.120 Al-
though there is a serious issue as to whether any of these statutes or 
rules provides a sufficient basis for a duty to preserve evidence,121 it 
is nevertheless clear that both the plaintiffs and the trial court were 
proceeding forward on the theory that the hospital violated a statu-
tory or administrative duty to retain the equipment intact and not on 
                                                                                                                    
 116. 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).   
 117. See Respondent Brinson’s Brief on the Merits at 31-39, St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. 
Brinson, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (No. 89,889); Petitioner St. Mary’s Hospital’s 
Initial Brief on the Merits at 34-40, St. Mary’s Hosp., Inc. v. Brinson, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1995) (No. 94-2130). 
 118. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b) (2000). This statute provides:  
 (b) User reports 
 (1)(A) Whenever a device user facility receives or otherwise becomes aware of 
information that reasonably suggests that a device has or may have caused or 
contributed to the death of a patient of the facility, the facility shall, as soon as 
practicable but not later than 10 working days after becoming aware of the in-
formation, report the information to the Secretary and, if the identity of the 
manufacturer is known, to the manufacturer of the device . . . . 
 (B) Whenever a device user facility receives or otherwise becomes aware 
of— 
 (i) information that reasonably suggests that a device has or may have 
caused or contributed to the serious illness of, or serious injury to, a patient of 
the facility, or 
 (ii) other significant adverse device experiences as determined by the Sec-
retary by regulation to be necessary to be reported, the facility shall, as soon as 
practicable but not later than 10 working days after becoming aware of the in-
formation, report the information to the manufacturer of the device or to the 
Secretary if the identity of the manufacturer is not known. 
 119. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (2001) provides in pertinent part: 
 (6)(a) Each licensed facility subject to this section shall submit an annual 
report to the agency summarizing the incident reports that have been filed in 
the facility for that year. 
 . . . . 
 (7) The licensed facility shall notify the agency no later than 1 business 
day after the risk manager or his or her designee has received a report pursu-
ant to paragraph (1)(d) and can determine within 1 business day that any of 
the following adverse incidents has occurred . . . . 
 120. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 59A-3.222 provides in pertinent part: 
 (1) Each hospital shall develop, implement, and maintain a written pre-
ventive maintenance plan, in conjunction with the policies and procedures de-
veloped by the infection control committee, to ensure that the facility is main-
tained in accordance with the following: 
 . . . . 
 (b) All patient care equipment shall be maintained in a clean, properly 
calibrated, and safe operating condition; . . . . 
 121. See infra Part VII.B.2 (discussing Statutory and Administrative Duties). 
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some common law duty based upon the foreseeability of future litiga-
tion. 
 Recently, the Fourth District further expanded upon Brinson in 
Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.,122 which recognized the exis-
tence of a duty to preserve evidence simply by virtue of the prepara-
tion of a work product incident report. Hagopian was injured while 
shopping in a Publix store in April of 1991 by a bottle that either ex-
ploded or fell off of a shelf. The store manager filled out an accident 
report and saved the bottle fragments, along with the other bottles 
from the same six-pack. 
 In July of 1991, plaintiff ’s  attorney wrote to Publix to put it on 
notice of Ms. Hagopian’s claim; however, no request was made to in-
spect the bottle fragments. Several months later the Publix store 
where the accident occurred was closed down and the bag with the 
fragments was not preserved. 
 While suit was eventually filed in 1994, the first request to inspect 
the bottle by the plaintiff was not made until 1997, some six years af-
ter the accident. Although recognizing that the fragments had been 
destroyed incidentally and prior to the initiation of suit, the Fourth 
District nevertheless concluded that the preparation of the incident 
report, coupled with Publix’s refusal to produce it on work product 
grounds, evidenced that it anticipated litigation, thereby creating a 
duty to preserve the potential evidence. 
 The further extension of Alcover and Brinson by Hagopian can 
hardly be deemed insignificant, because the existence of a legally 
recognized duty is the cornerstone of tort law.123 Even under contract 
theories there must be a legal duty arising either as the result of an 
express or implied agreement. Thus, if the opinions in these cases are 
used to support the creation of such a duty merely by virtue of the 
                                                                                                                    
 122. 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
 123. The scope of Brinson was originally also cast into doubt by the Fourth District’s 
subsequent decision in Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). 
Without reference to Brinson, the court concluded that a duty to preserve documents arose 
by virtue of a discovery request seeking such documents in a pending lawsuit. Although 
not expressly rejecting the contention that such a duty can arise prior to the filing of the 
lawsuit, this was the clear implication of the court’s ruling: 
Appellants claim that because there was no lawful duty on their part to pre-
serve the evidence, the claim should never have gone to the jury. While we 
agree that Appellants were under no statutory or contractual duty to maintain 
such evidence, a party does have an affirmative responsibility to preserve any 
items or documents that are the subject of a duly served discovery request. 
(“[T]he duty of a litigant to preserve relevant evidence is established by the op-
posing party’s submission of a discovery request identifying documents of the 
same subject matter as those which the receiving party possesses . . . .”). 
Id. at 1093-94 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, in light of its even more 
recent Hagopian decision, it appears the Fourth District did not intend to limit Brinson in 
this manner. 
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fact that an accident occurred, so that a lawsuit (just like Mary’s 
lamb) was sure to follow, the practical and legal ramifications of such 
decisions are extremely troubling. 
 Does this mean that every time there is an accident that involves 
some instrumentality, product, or condition, the owner or possessor 
must preserve it intact until a lawsuit is filed, sometimes years later, 
so that all of the attorneys and their experts can examine it? Would a 
landowner be guilty of spoliation of evidence simply because he fills 
in a hole on his premises that someone tripped in to make his prop-
erty safer? Are the drivers of two cars that collide guilty of spoliation 
of evidence because they move their cars off of the busy highway or 
because they subsequently repair their cars? Is a store owner guilty 
of destroying evidence because he cleans up a spill in which a patron 
fell or because he retiles the floor to make it safer?124 Is an electric 
utility guilty of spoliation every time it repairs a generator that 
caused a power outage, as claimed in Pennsylvania Lumberman’s 
Mutual Insurance Co.?125 An affirmative answer to any of these ques-
tions does not require much of an extension of Brinson, Alcover, and 
Hagopian.126 
IV.   FEDERAL TREATMENT 
 The threshold question faced by federal courts is whether the spo-
liation issues are to be decided by the substantive law of the forum 
state or by federal evidentiary or procedural law. As typical, there is 
authority supporting both points of view.127 
                                                                                                                    
 124. See also examples posed in Bard D. Rockenbach, Spolitation of Evidence: A Dou-
ble-Edged Sword, 75 FLA. BAR J. 34 (2001).  
 125. 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). As observed by Florida Power & Light in its 
brief:  
Such a requirement would cripple FPL by requiring it to retain thousands upon 
thousands of useless transformers for years. While this may, at first blush ap-
pear alarmist, the court will agree that every power outage raises the potential 
for litigation—everything from computer related problems to elevator entrap-
ment. The plaintiff’s proposal would require Florida Power and Light to keep 
every failed transformer at least until the statute of limitations expires in four 
years. 
Answer Brief of Appellee Florida Power & Light Co. at 12-13, Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (No. 98-01290). 
 126. These situations are not at all far-fetched. The author has previously defended a 
lawsuit in which a cruise ship passenger claimed to have been injured on a chair that al-
legedly broke. After the passenger advised the Staff Captain that he was not injured in the 
accident, the chair was discarded or repaired. One year later the passenger sued the cruise 
line for injuries alleged to have been sustained from the collapsing chair. Two years after 
the suit was initially filed, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to assert a cause of 
action for spoliation of evidence. See Schulmann v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 97-
24239 CA 01 (27) (Fla. Miami-Dade County Ct. 1999). 
 127. See Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994) (and cases re-
ferred to therein); see also Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 
1991). 
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 Federal courts have generally looked to either their inherent 
power to regulate litigation or the authority granted by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure to sanction discovery abuses as their source 
of authority in fashioning spoliation remedies.128 Generally these 
remedies have taken the form of adverse inferences129 or the exclu-
sion of expert testimony.130 Federal courts have also generally dif-
fered as to whether bad faith is a prerequisite for the imposition of 
spoliation remedies.131 
 The Eleventh Circuit treats spoliation of evidence claims through 
the use of adverse inferences; however, this requires a showing of 
bad faith.132 “‘Mere negligence’ in losing or destroying the records is 
not enough for an adverse inference, as ‘it does not sustain an infer-
ence of consciousness of a weak case.’”133 Accordingly, in Bashir, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that in the absence of bad faith amounting to 
evidence tampering, the railroad’s failure to preserve a speed re-
corder tape would not give rise to an adverse inference, even though 
it was central to the plaintiff ’s  case, which was based upon the claim 
that the train had been traveling at an excessive rate of speed.134 
 Surprisingly, although the Eleventh Circuit required bad faith to 
obtain an adverse inference in the case of spoliation, it required only 
a showing of negligence as a predicate to obtaining discovery sanc-
tions in Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co.135 for the inciden-
tal destruction of documents. The court predicated an award of at-
torney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) because the 
defendant did not promptly admit that the requested documents had 
been destroyed, requiring the plaintiff to expend attorney’s fees in 
litigating the discoverability of the nonexistent documents. 
                                                                                                                    
 128. See Banco Latino, S.A.C.A. v. Lopez, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (and 
cases cited therein). 
 129. See, e.g., Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929 (11th Cir. 1997); Vodusek v. Bayliner 
Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995); Vick v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 514 F.2d 734 
(5th Cir. 1975).  
 130. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 131. Compare Bashir, 119 F.3d at 932 (requiring bad faith), with Vodusek, 71 F.3d 148, 
and Glover v. Bic Corp., 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a showing of bad faith is 
not required). 
 132. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931; Vick, 514 F.2d at 737. Vick was adopted as binding 
precedent by virtue of Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). 
 133. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931 (citations omitted) (quoting Vick). 
 134. Id. at 932.  
 135. 125 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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V.   THE NEED TO REDEFINE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE REMEDIES  
IN FLORIDA 
A.   Constitutional Limitations 
 Although Valcin has often been cited as authority for the more re-
cent spoliation of evidence opinions, the Florida Supreme Court’s de-
cision was extremely limited in nature and not intended to be given 
the broad scope that some of these more recent decisions have attrib-
uted to it. Perhaps even more importantly, in Valcin the supreme 
court reversed the district court of appeal’s adoption of an irrebut-
table presumption of negligence on constitutional grounds, even 
though it was limited to situations where the failure to create or 
maintain records was both intentional and required by statute.  
 It is hard to rationalize how the entry of a default judgment or the 
striking of a party’s pleadings is any less of an abridgement upon 
that party’s right to due process or trial by jury than the use of the 
irrebuttable presumption rejected in Valcin. In each case the result 
is the same. Instead, the court in Valcin utilized the least drastic 
remedy possible in an effort to remedy the required abuse, while at 
the same time preserving both parties’ right to due process and trial 
by jury. In so doing, the supreme court further made it clear that 
even this narrow remedy was to be given a very restricted applica-
tion, stating “We first stress the limited function of the presumption. 
. . . The presumption, shifting the burden of producing the evidence, 
is given life only to equalize the parties’ respective positions in re-
gard to the evidence and to allow the plaintiff to proceed.”136 
 Therefore, to fill the need for such a remedy while at the same 
time making a workable and practicable solution that does not im-
pair the parties’ constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury, 
the further development of the principle of spoliation of evidence 
must not lose sight of the remedy’s limited nature as well as its po-
tential to do considerable constitutional mischief. 
B.   California’s About-Face 
 The nationwide expansion of spoliation remedies received a seri-
ous setback in 1998, when the California Supreme Court in Cedars-
Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court refused to recognize the tort 
created by one of its immediate appellate courts fourteen years ear-
lier.137 In a medical malpractice case against a hospital arising from 
birth-related injuries, the California Supreme Court reversed a long 
line of prior decisions by intermediate appellate courts recognizing a 
tort for the intentional spoliation of evidence. The court concluded:  
                                                                                                                    
 136. Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596, 599-600 (Fla. 1987). 
 137. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
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The intentional destruction of evidence is a grave affront to the 
cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation. There 
are, however, existing and effective nontort remedies for this prob-
lem. Moreover, a tort remedy would impose a number of undesir-
able social costs, as well as running counter to important policies 
against creating tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct.138 
 The court began its analysis by first addressing the issue of duty. 
After noting that all torts involve a violation of a legal duty “imposed 
by statute, contract or otherwise,”139 it then went on to further ob-
serve that: “the concept of duty ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclu-
sion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself.’ It is ‘only an expression 
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law 
to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’”140 
 The court thereafter turned to the policy considerations giving 
rise to the need for a tort remedy to address spoliation: 
No one doubts that the intentional destruction of evidence should 
be condemned. Destroying evidence can destroy fairness and jus-
tice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits 
of the underlying cause of action. Destroying evidence can also in-
crease the costs of litigation as parties attempt to reconstruct the 
destroyed evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less 
accessible, less persuasive, or both. 
 That alone, however, is not enough to justify creating tort liabil-
ity for such conduct. We must also determine whether a tort rem-
edy for the intentional first party spoliation of evidence would ul-
timately create social benefits exceeding those created by existing 
remedies for such conduct, and outweighing any costs and burdens 
it would impose. Three concerns in particular stand out here: the 
conflict between a tort remedy for intentional first party spoliation 
and the policy against creating derivative tort remedies for litiga-
tion-related misconduct; the strength of existing nontort remedies 
for spoliation; and the uncertainty of the fact of harm in spoliation 
cases.141 
 As with Chief Judge Schwartz’s dissent in Valcin, the court placed 
great reliance upon the common law’s long history of limiting reme-
dies for litigation-related misconduct to sanctions within the underly-
ing lawsuit, rather than by creating new derivative actions. Relying 
upon the need for finality to litigation, the court observed that Cali-
fornia law did not allow separate causes of action for perjury, con-
cealing or withholding evidence, or the presentation of false evidence, 
despite the obvious grievous nature of such offenses. Accordingly, the 
court concluded: “‘Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever fi-
                                                                                                                    
 138. Id. at 512. 
 139. Id. at 514. 
 140. Id. at 515 (citations omitted). 
 141. Id.  
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nally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of 
justice . . . .’”142 
 The court’s analysis next turned to the availability of alternative 
nontort remedies already in existence to remedy spoliation. Foremost 
among these remedies is the existence of an evidentiary inference, 
which can be tailored to remedy the specific facts of the spoliation in-
volved in a particular case. Other remedies include the full range of 
sanctions typically permitted for discovery abuses, including fines, 
contempt, the establishment of particular designated facts, the strik-
ing of specific claims or defenses, disciplinary sanctions against at-
torneys, and even criminal penalties. The court concluded that the 
wide range of alternative remedies available was clearly sufficient to 
remedy spoliation of evidence without resort to an independent tort. 
 The next stage of the court’s analysis focused upon the lack of cer-
tainty associated with the damage claims inherent in spoliation ac-
tions. In such cases, the court concluded: 
[E]ven if the jury infers from the act of spoliation that the 
spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable to the spoliator, 
there will typically be no way of telling what precisely the evidence 
would have shown and how much it would have weighed in the 
spoliation victim’s favor. Without knowing the content and weight 
of the spoliated evidence, it would be impossible for the jury to 
meaningfully assess what role the missing evidence would have 
played in the determination of the underlying action. The jury 
could only speculate as to what the nature of the spoliated evi-
dence was and what effect it might have had on the outcome of the 
underlying litigation.143 
 After concluding that the problems inherent in a tort remedy for 
spoliation of evidence outweighed the value for such a cause of ac-
tion, the court looked to the indirect effects that such cause of action 
might produce. At the top of the list were the immeasurable expenses 
that society as a whole would incur as businesses and individuals 
were required “to take extraordinary measures to preserve for an in-
definite period documents and things of no apparent value solely to 
avoid the possibility of spoliation liability if years later those items 
turn out to have some potential relevance to future litigation.”144 
 The court also looked to the costs of litigating what it termed 
“meritless spoliation actions,”145 where the potentially relevant evi-
dence no longer existed because it had been discarded or misplaced 
in the ordinary course of events rather than for any ulterior purpose. 
                                                                                                                    
 142. Id. at 517.  
 143. Id. at 518. 
 144. Id. at 519. 
 145. Id. 
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“Many corporations and other entities, for example, have document 
retention policies under which they destroy at stated intervals docu-
ments for which they anticipate having no further need. The mere 
fact of destruction, however, would permit a disappointed litigant to 
sue the prevailing party for spoliation . . . .”146 
 Finally, the court weighed the practical difficulties in trying a spo-
liation tort cause of action jointly with the claims in the underlying 
action. At the very least, the court concluded that such a joinder of 
claims would create a very significant potential for jury confusion 
and inconsistencies of results.147 
 On the other hand, requiring the spoliation remedy to proceed 
separately from the underlying action: 
[W]ould result in duplicative proceedings without avoiding the po-
tential for inconsistent results. The spoliation action would require 
a “retrial within a trial” for all of the evidence in the underlying 
action would have to be presented again so that the spoliation jury 
could determine what effect the spoliated evidence would have had 
in light of all of the other evidence.148 
 As a result of its analysis, the court concluded that while the in-
tentional spoliation of evidence is “an unqualified wrong,”149 that it 
was: 
[T]he rare case in which a tort remedy for an intentionally caused 
harm is not appropriate. The remedies already available in first 
party spoliation cases to the spoliation victim, especially the evi-
dentiary inference provided by Evidence Code section 413 and the 
discovery remedies of Code of Civil Procedure section 2023, provide 
a substantial deterrent to acts of spoliation, and substantial pro-
tection to the spoliation victim. Given that existing remedies will 
in most cases be effective at ensuring that the issues in the under-
lying litigation are fairly decided, whatever incremental additional 
benefits a tort remedy might create are outweighed by the policy 
considerations and costs described above.150 
VI.   THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES 
 Most states now recognize some form of a spoliation of evidence 
remedy,151 although a number still do not allow a separate cause of 
                                                                                                                    
 146. Id. at 519-20 (citations omitted). 
 147. Id. at 520. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 521.  
 150. Id.  
 151. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith 
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Levinson v. Citizens Nat’l Bank, 
644 N.E.2d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 
1995); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Smith v. How-
ard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). 
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action.152 Those states that do permit spoliation claims generally rec-
ognize the necessity for the existence of a duty to preserve the evi-
dence in the first instance; however, they have defined the duty in a 
variety of different manners. 
 Indiana, for instance, which refers to its tort as intentional inter-
ference with civil litigation, limits its application to the following 
situations: where there exists “an independent tort, contract, agree-
ment, or special relationship imposing a duty to the particular claim-
ant.”153 The Kansas Supreme Court, which adopted a similar stan-
dard, stated: 
Appellant readily concedes in his brief that “no jurisdiction has 
recognized a general common-law duty to preserve evidence” and 
that “under the present case law, [defendant] has no articulated 
common-law duty to preserve [plaintiff ’s ] evidence.” It is funda-
mental that before there can be any recovery in tort there must be 
a violation of a duty owed by one party to the person seeking re-
covery.154 
 Several states, however, have concluded that a duty to preserve 
evidence arises where there is “[p]ending or probable litigation in-
volving the plaintiff” and “knowledge on the part of defendant that 
litigation exists or is probable.”155 Some of the factors which courts 
have looked at to determine whether a party has sufficient notice of 
pending litigation are whether it has performed a formal investiga-
tion156 or retained its own experts.157 Other states follow different 
rules for defining the duty to preserve evidence whether the spolia-
tion is alleged to be intentional or merely negligent.158 
                                                                                                                    
 152. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 163 (D. Col. 1994) (recognizing spo-
liation remedy as a rule of evidence rather than a claim for relief); Beers v. Bayliner Ma-
rine Corp., 675 A.2d 829 (Conn. 1996) (inference only is allowed); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1990) (concluding suffi-
cient remedies exist under Minnesota law without creating a new tort); Brown v. Hamid, 
856 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (refusing to follow Bondu’s rationale in allowing a 
claim against a doctor for failing to keep medical records); Proske v. St. Barnabus Med. 
Ctr., 712 A.2d 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). In Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429, 
432 (Ala. 2000), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that it was not recognizing a new 
cause of action because a claim for negligent spoliation could be “stated under existing 
negligence law without creating a new tort.”  
 153. Levinson, 644 N.E.2d at 1268. 
 154. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Kan. 1987). 
 155. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d at 1038; see also State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Graves v. Daley, 526 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988); Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991); Fire Ins. Exch. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987) (involving situation where party is on no-
tice of potential litigation); Hirsch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1993); Viviano, 597 A.2d 543.  
 156. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. at 163; Zenith Radio Corp., 747 P.2d at 914. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (following the Indiana 
rule for intentional claims and the Ohio rule for claims based upon negligence). 
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VII.   A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
A.   Is a Separate Cause of Action Merited? 
 The Florida Supreme Court has yet to expressly recognize a sepa-
rate cause of action for spoliation of evidence. As with California, the 
remedy was first developed by the state’s intermediate appellate 
courts. The obvious question that arises is whether the Florida ex-
perience will mirror the California one once the Florida Supreme 
Court finally weighs in on this issue. 
 The arguments against recognizing a separate cause of action are 
thoroughly expressed and analyzed by the California Supreme Court 
in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court.159 Although dis-
cussed in much more detail in Part V.B of this Article, these argu-
ments include the conclusion that a separate cause of action is un-
necessary in light of existing remedies;160 the strong policies against 
creating derivative tort remedies for litigation-related misconduct 
underlying the law; the uncertainty of establishing harm; and the 
adverse indirect effects of such a cause of action, particularly on 
normal business practices and the significant practical difficulties 
caused in trying a spoliation claim, either jointly or separately from 
the underlying claim. 
 Florida’s District Courts of Appeal, which have recognized a sepa-
rate cause of action, have generally relied upon the decisions in 
Smith v. Superior Court161 and Valcin v. Public Health Trust.162 The 
                                                                                                                    
 159. 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998). 
 160. As pointed out in the 2000 Handbook on Discovery Practice published by the Joint 
Committee of the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar and Conferences of Circuit and 
County Court Judges, “[m]any practitioners are frustrated by the ostensible reluctance of 
trial courts to sanction parties for discovery abuse. This reluctance probably stems from 
the trial courts’ failure to fully appreciate their broad powers.” JOINT COMM. OF THE TRIAL 
LAWYERS SECTION OF THE FLA. BAR AND CONFERENCES OF CIRCUIT AND COUNTY COURT 
JUDGES, 2000 HANDBOOK ON DISCOVERY PRACTICE 1 [hereinafter 2000 HANDBOOK]. As fur-
ther noted in the Handbook, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.380(b)(2) specifies the per-
missible sanctions including: 
 A. An order that the matters about which the questions were asked or any 
other designated facts shall be taken to be established; 
 B. An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose des-
ignated claims or defenses or prohibiting that party from introducing certain 
matters in evidence; 
 C. An order striking pleadings or staying further proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, or dismissing the action or part of it, or rendering a judgement of de-
fault against the disobedient party; 
 D. In addition to the above, an order treating is contempt of count the failure 
to obey; . . . 
 . . . . 
 F. [T]he [award of] reasonable expenses . . . which may include attorney’s 
fees . . . . 
Id. at 3-4. 
 161. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).  
 162. 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987). 
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validity of such a conceptual framework, however, is extremely ques-
tionable. Not only has Smith been overruled, but the Florida Su-
preme Court’s decision in Valcin stopped far short of recognizing a 
separate cause of action for spoliation of evidence. 
 In fact, the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Valcin raises seri-
ous questions concerning the constitutional validity of such a new 
tort by concluding that the sanctioning of an irrebutable presumption 
of negligence, even where the spoliation (failure to keep records) was 
intentional, would constitute a violation of the defendant’s right to 
due process, as well as an abrogation of the jury’s function.163 In 
striking the broader remedy fashioned by the Third District on the 
basis that it “sw[ept] wider than necessary,”164 the Florida Supreme 
Court also repeatedly stressed the need to strictly limit spoliation 
remedies only to the specific action necessary to cure the prejudice 
created to avoid these constitutional problems. 
 In light of the numerous less-burdensome and constitutionally 
troubling remedies available to directly address the prejudice caused 
in spoliation circumstances, a separate cause of action appears to be 
both superfluous and outside the scope of permissible remedies. 
 Similarly, the recognition of a separate cause of action where the 
spoliation is unintentional or merely negligent is also inconsistent 
with the well-established law of Florida governing discovery sanc-
tions. Florida courts have repeatedly held that the striking of plead-
ings or dismissal of a suit with prejudice for noncompliance with a 
discovery order are the severest of sanctions, which are only appro-
priate where the offending party willfully and deliberately fails to 
comply with previous discovery orders.165 “Therefore, it is only appro-
priate to strike a party’s pleadings when that party willfully fails to 
comply with discovery orders. Striking pleadings or entering a de-
fault also is proper when a party engages in willful misconduct.”166 
 Even in the criminal law context, where there is a much higher 
burden on the state to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence for 
the defense than upon the parties in a civil suit, the defendant is re-
quired to establish bad faith on the part of the law enforcement per-
sonnel in discarding such evidence before a denial of due process is 
found to exist.167 For example, in Arizona v. Youngblood,168 the 
                                                                                                                    
 163. Id. at 599. 
 164. Id.  
 165. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hoffman, 718 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); United States 
Fire Ins. Co. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 674 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Davis Garden 
Estates, Inc. v. Am. Inv. Realty, Inc., 670 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). 
 166. 2000 HANDBOOK, supra note 160, at 7-8 (emphasis added). 
 167. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); see also Merck v. State, 664 So. 2d 939 
(Fla. 1995); State v. Erwin, 686 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). 
 168. 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
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United States Supreme Court rejected claims that a defendant had 
been denied due process by the state’s failure to preserve critical se-
men samples in a rape prosecution, even though the samples might 
have exculpated the defendant because the critical issue in the case 
had been the identification of the rapist. The Court’s decision was an 
outgrowth of its earlier opinion in California v. Trombetta,169 in 
which it refused to suppress the results of a breath test upon which a 
drunk driving conviction was based, where the police discarded the 
test samples before they could be analyzed by the defendant’s expert. 
 In both cases, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of the 
government’s lack of bad faith in discarding the evidence. Although 
noting that the government’s good faith or lack thereof was not rele-
vant in cases dealing with the state’s violation of its constitutional 
duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the Court concluded 
that a different analysis was required where the issue was the fail-
ure to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said 
than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant.170 The Court went on to ob-
serve that “[p]art of the reason for the difference in treatment is . . . 
[that] ‘whenever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently 
lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of mate-
rials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.’”171 
Accordingly, the Court held that even negligence on the part of the 
police would not be a sufficient ground to base a due process claim 
and that instead actual bad faith was required. 
B.   The Existence of a Duty to Preserve 
 Regardless of whether a separate cause of action is recognized 
or whether spoliation remedies are limited to presently existing 
alternatives, the first issue that must be addressed in any analy-
sis is whether a duty exists on the part of the possessor to pre-
serve or maintain the evidence. Without such a duty, there can be 
no valid legal basis for the imposition of sanctions, much less the 
striking of pleadings or the award of damages. Likewise, without a 
clear delineation of the parameters of the duty to preserve evi-
dence, one cannot determine whether they are subjecting them-
selves to liability by cleaning up a spilled substance on a grocery 
store’s floor, moving a damaged car off the road, or disposing of a 
broken chair. 
                                                                                                                    
 169. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
 170. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. 
 171. Id. at 57-58. 
2002]                          SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 1321 
 
 Although it is easy to find such a legal duty where there is a court 
order,172 a promise to preserve evidence,173 a statute,174 or administra-
tive regulation175 requiring documents to be maintained, the exis-
tence of such a duty is much more difficult to find (and justify) in the 
absence of such circumstances. As discussed above, several recent 
cases have gone so far as to imply the existence of such a duty by the 
mere fact that litigation may some day be filed.176 
 The Third District has rejected the contention that a common law 
duty exists to preserve a defective product, at least in the absence of 
actual notification of legal action or a request to maintain the prod-
uct.177 Courts from other states have also refused to find such a com-
mon law duty on a variety of different grounds. In Koplin v. Rosel 
Well Perforators, Inc.,178 for example, the Supreme Court of Kansas 
observed: 
[A]bsent a duty to preserve the [product], appellee is not a wrong-
doer and had an absolute right to preserve or destroy its own prop-
erty as it saw fit. To adopt such a tort and place a duty upon an 
employer to preserve all possible physical evidence that might 
somehow be utilized in a third party action by an injured employee 
would place an intolerable burden upon every employer.179 
As a result, the court went on to conclude that “absent some inde-
pendent tort, contract, agreement, voluntary assumption of duty, or 
special relationship of the parties,”180 the State of Kansas would not 
recognize an independent tort based upon spoliation of evidence. 
1.   Common Law Duty 
 The formal filing of a lawsuit provides a clear line of demarcation 
for setting such a duty in the absence of an applicable statute, ad-
ministrative rule, or promise to preserve evidence, because it clearly 
places all parties on notice of their need to comply with all applicable 
                                                                                                                    
 172. See, e.g., Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Menzies, 561 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 173. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); 
Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 174. See, e.g., Builder’s Square, Inc. v. Shaw, 755 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (im-
posing a statutory duty upon employer to preserve evidence critical to employee’s potential 
third party claim via worker’s compensation statute). 
 175. See, e.g., Valcin v. Pub. Health Trust, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987). 
 176. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2001); St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Brinson, 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sponco Mfg., Inc. v. 
Alcover, 656 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). 
 177. Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 724 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1998). 
 178. 734 P.2d 1177 (Kan. 1987). 
 179. Id. at 1181-82.  
 180. Id. at 1183. 
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rules of court, including the duty to preserve evidence.181 In addition, 
the filing of a lawsuit also brings attorneys, who can better gauge 
what constitutes evidence and its potential role in the upcoming liti-
gation, into the picture. Nevertheless, total reliance upon such a 
bright line standard may be too harsh, particularly where there is no 
doubt that litigation will in fact result, or if the evidence is absolutely 
essential to a fair trial. 
 There is always a danger of creating too impracticable or mean-
ingless a rule by making it too fact-specific. Such a rule would 
require a case-by-case determination of its applicability. However, 
a certain amount of flexibility is needed to prevent unfair and un-
just results. In this context, reference to the types of circum-
stances that have been found to give rise to common law duties 
under traditional tort law can be useful to determine whether an 
analogous duty to preserve evidence is appropriate in the presuit 
setting. The most commonly accepted situations in which such a 
common law duty would logically be recognized are where: (1) 
there is an express request for the evidence actually communi-
cated to the possessor; (2) it is necessary to protect one party from 
its reasonable detrimental reliance upon the other; (3) one party is 
prevented or thwarted from acting or conducting an attempted in-
vestigation by another; (4) a special relationship exists requiring 
protection of one party’s interests by the other; or (5) there is a 
voluntary assumption of a duty or responsibility by one party to 
protect the other’s interests.182 
2.   Statutory and Administrative Duties 
 The threshold question in determining the existence of a statu-
torily created duty to retain evidence is whether such a duty 
arises only where the statute in question creates a private cause of 
action for its breach. Although this issue was addressed by the 
litigants in St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc. v. Brinson,183 it was never an-
swered by the Fourth District, which simply ignored the issue in 
its opinion. 
 A statutory tort cause of action, just as a common law one, con-
sists of four elements: (1) a duty, (2) a breach of the duty, (3) cau-
sation, and (4) damages.184 In determining whether there is a 
                                                                                                                    
 181. See, e.g., Strasser v. Yalamanchi, 783 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Figgie 
Int’l, Inc. v. Alderman, 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 
 182. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831 (D. Kan. 1992); Smith 
v. Atkinson, 771 So. 2d 429 (Ala. 2000); Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983); Koplin 
734 P.2d 1177.   
 183. 685 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). 
 184. See, e.g., Luckie v. McCall Mfg. Co., 153 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); Fla. Ry. 
Co. v. Dorsey, 52 So. 963 (Fla. 1910). 
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statutory cause of action, the focus therefore goes beyond the 
question of whether there is merely a duty, but also includes the 
policy question of whether the law recognizes a private right to en-
force a violation of that duty.185 
 From a logical standpoint, the critical issue in the spoliation 
analysis should therefore not focus on whether the statute creates 
a private cause of action but whether it creates a duty to preserve 
evidence. In fact, where the statutory violation gives rise to a spe-
cific cause of action, arguably no additional remedy is necessary. 
Reference to statutes to determine the existence or scope of a duty, 
even where the statute’s violation does not give rise to private 
causes of action, is typical in many other analogous contexts in the 
law. 
 For example, violations of traffic regulations generally consti-
tute evidence of negligence in the operation of motor vehicles.186 
Likewise, violations of administrative rules often are found to con-
stitute evidence of negligence in products liability cases.187 Simi-
larly, violation of a bar rule will be considered evidence of legal 
malpractice in a civil action,188 even though the Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar expressly provide that such a violation will not 
give rise to a civil cause of action.189 
 For such statutes or administrative regulations to give rise to a 
duty in the spoliation context, however, they must expressly re-
quire the preservation of the evidence in question. As pointed out 
in the previous discussion of Brinson,190 neither the federal191 nor 
state statutes192 relied upon by the plaintiff created any express 
duty upon the hospital to save the purportedly defective anesthe-
sia equipment. At most, these statutes merely required the hospi-
tal to report the incident in question to the appropriate authori-
ties. Even in the less demanding context of considering 
nonbinding statutes as evidence of negligence, the statutory provi-
sions must at least be relevant and directly applicable to the con-
duct in question. 
                                                                                                                    
 185. The guidelines for determining whether a statute gives rise to a private cause of 
action are found in the Florida Supreme Court case Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 
983 (Fla. 1994). 
 186. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CIV) 4.11. 
 187. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp 714 
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (involving FDA regulations); Keil v. Eli Lilly & Co., 490 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. 
Mich. 1980). 
 188. Pressley v. Farley, 579 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). 
 189. PREAMBLE, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR. 
 190. See supra Part III. 
 191. 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b) (2000). 
 192. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (2001). 
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3.   Scope of Duty 
 Closely related to the issue of the existence of a duty to pre-
serve evidence is the corollary question of the extent of this duty. 
This question, in turn, is divided into two separate subissues, each 
with different considerations. 
 a.   Tangible Evidence.—Once the duty to preserve tangible 
evidence is established, the scope of the duty is largely defined by the 
evidence’s potential importance to the precise issues raised in the 
litigation and the inability to replace the evidence through other 
means. Thus, while the loss of a particular product would potentially 
have tremendous significance in a products liability action based 
upon a defect in its construction, it would have much less importance 
in a case based upon defective design.193 
 This issue was addressed initially in Valcin194 and more recently 
in Harrell v. Mayberry.195 In assessing the prejudice caused to the 
plaintiff by failing to prepare the operative report required by statute 
in Valcin, the supreme court observed that the absence of such a re-
cord will not necessarily bear on the issues in all malpractice cases. 
Accordingly, the court went on to hold that spoliation remedies will 
only be appropriate when necessary to correct the loss of evidence 
which is essential to the issues necessary to be proved. 
 In Harrell, the Second District Court of Appeal was faced with the 
loss of relevant evidence, a tripmaster that recorded the truck’s 
speed and use of its lights, two central issues in the case.196 Neverthe-
less, the court still concluded that spoliation remedies were not ap-
propriate because sufficient alternative evidence existed for the 
plaintiff to prove its case. The court observed that “[c]ollisions be-
tween vehicles without tripmaster devices occur all of the time and 
proceed to litigation.”197 
 Therefore, for spoliation remedies to be applicable, the missing 
evidence must be both directly relevant to the issues to be tried and 
incapable of replacement through other available evidence. 
                                                                                                                    
 193. See Beers v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 833 (Conn. 1996) (discussing 
evidence issues in product liability cases). 
 194. 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987). 
 195. 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
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 197. Id. at 745. 
2002]                          SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE 1325 
 
 b.   Intangible Evidence.—Cases throughout the country have also 
extended spoliation of evidence principles to nonphysical “evidence” 
as well. For example, an injured bus passenger was allowed to 
recover damages where the driver failed to obtain sufficient 
identification of the truck colliding with his vehicle so as to deprive 
his passengers of their potential claim.198 
 Although Florida appellate decisions have not yet gone so far, the 
Fourth District’s opinion in Brown199 comes very close. The plaintiff, 
who was seriously injured in a bicycle accident with a hit-and-run 
driver, entrusted his bicycle to the local police department as part of 
its criminal investigation into the accident. Although the police de-
partment allegedly agreed to preserve the bicycle and return it to the 
plaintiff along with all of the other “evidence” that it had collected at 
the conclusion of the investigation, everything was discarded. 
 In upholding the plaintiff ’s  subsequent spoliation claim against 
the police department, the Fourth District concluded that it was not 
limited to merely the loss of the plaintiff ’s  bicycle, but also included 
the other evidence collected by the police from sources besides the 
plaintiff. Therefore, the court expanded the spoliation claim to in-
clude not only the specific property owned by the party, but 
nonowned property as well.200 
C.   The Significance of Intent 
 Florida’s appellate courts have also disagreed over the signifi-
cance and importance of the intent of the party in destroying evi-
dence under virtually identical circumstances. An example of the 
disparate treatment of this issue is seen by contrasting the First Dis-
trict’s decision in Metropolitan Dade County v. Bermudez201 with the 
Third District’s opinions in Figgie International Inc. v. Alderman202 
and DeLong v. A-Top Air Conditioning Co.203 
 In Bermudez, the First District reversed the trial judge’s exclusion 
of the defendant’s expert in a case based upon an automobile acci-
dent. Following the expert’s examination of the vehicle in an effort to 
find evidence to support the defendant’s seatbelt defense, the plain-
tiff requested the opportunity to inspect the vehicle. However, the de-
fendant advised him that it had been previously destroyed. In fact, it 
was subsequently determined that the vehicle had still been in exis-
                                                                                                                    
 198. De Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 199. Brown v. City of Delray Beach, 652 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 
 200. But see Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding no 
duty exists to investigate incident to passenger in the absence of an express promise).   
 201. 648 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). 
 202. 698 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). 
 203. 710 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). 
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tence at the time of the request and was not actually destroyed until 
twenty-two months later. 
 In reversing the lower court’s decision, the First District directed 
it to reevaluate its action based upon the following test: 
What sanctions are appropriate when a party fails to preserve evi-
dence in its custody depends on the willfulness or bad faith, if any, 
of the party responsible for the loss of the evidence, the extent of 
prejudice suffered by the other party or parties, and what is re-
quired to cure the prejudice.204 
 Although Alderman involved significantly greater egregious con-
duct, the Third District concluded, “[d]ocument-production requests 
put the parties on notice that documents should be preserved, re-
gardless of the spoliator’s subjective intent.”205 Likewise, in DeLong, 
the court expressly took pains to note that the evidence was “inad-
vertently lost or misplaced.”206 
 This confusion in Florida has been further exacerbated by the fact 
that there has been a lack of internal consistency even among indi-
vidual district courts of appeal. For example, the Third District fol-
lowed its earlier Alderman and DeLong opinions with its decision in 
Kloster Cruise Ltd. v. Igac,207 in which the court refused to require a 
spoliation instruction where the plaintiff “lost” a critical CAT scan, 
stating “[w]e cannot conclude that this is one of ‘those extremely rare 
instances that the evidence establishes an intentional interference 
with a party’s access to critical medical records.’” Although not ap-
parent from the court’s brief opinion, the record of the case shows 
that the critical CAT scan disappeared three months after the defen-
dant’s request for production, despite the court’s earlier admonition 
in Alderman.208 
 As discussed in more detail in the following subsection analyzing 
alternative remedies, there is a conceptual difference between at-
tempting to address the intentional destruction or failure to preserve 
evidence as compared to conduct that is merely negligent or innocent. 
Where the spoliation does not constitute an intentional attempt to 
destroy evidence for the purpose of prejudicing another party, the 
remedy to be fashioned should be compensatory in nature rather 
than punitive. Where the actions were not taken for the purpose of 
gaining an undue or unfair advantage in litigation, the goal should 
be merely to place the parties in the same position they would have 
                                                                                                                    
 204. Bermudez, 648 So. 2d at 200 (emphasis added). 
 205. 698 So. 2d at 567 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 206. 710 So. 2d at 707. 
 207. 741 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Pub. Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 
2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987)), rev. denied, 762 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2000).  
 208. 698 So. 2d at 564. 
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been in had the evidence been preserved. As also subsequently dis-
cussed in more detail, there are generally sufficient alternative 
remedies—short of recognizing a separate cause of action for spolia-
tion of evidence—that exist to address this type of situation. 
 On the other hand, where there has been an intent to perpetrate a 
fraud or to prejudice a party, punitive action is generally warranted. 
In such a case, the goal is not only to remove any disadvantage oc-
curring to the innocent party but also to punish the wrongdoer for his 
conduct and to further set an example to deter others from similar 
actions.209 Under these circumstances, a separate cause of action is 
more warranted as recognized by many states which limit such 
claims to intentional spoliation. 
D.   Degree of Damage or Prejudice 
 Loose language in several cases has caused a gradual erosion as to 
the degree of damage or prejudice that must exist before spoliation 
principles will be given effect in Florida. In Valcin and the early Flor-
ida spoliation cases, the courts required the plaintiff to establish that 
the missing evidence prevented it from establishing even a prima fa-
cie case.210 Although most subsequent cases have reasserted this re-
quirement,211 some recent cases, however, have appeared to signifi-
cantly lower the bar by implying that it is only necessary for the 
plaintiff to establish that it was “hindered,”212 “impaired,”213 or “cost 
[him] an opportunity to prove [his] lawsuit.”214 
 In the recent Strasser v. Yalamanchi decision, the court appeared 
to be trying to strike a middle ground between these positions by 
holding: 
Florida law does not require that it be impossible for a party to 
prove its case in order to recover damages on a spoliation claim. A 
party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may 
still be able to prevail in an action for breach of contract on the ba-
sis of existing evidence, albeit to a lesser extent and for reduced 
damages.215 
                                                                                                                    
 209. See, e.g., Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). 
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 215. 783 So. 2d 1087, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (emphasis added). 
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 Of course, the Third District reached the nearly opposite conclu-
sion in Herman,216 thereby leaving the status of Florida law on this 
precise issue in doubt. Conceptually, the “loss of chance” standard is 
inconsistent with Florida tort law in general, as even routine negli-
gence cases typically require proof of causation at least to a “more 
likely than not” standard.217 The “hindered” and “impaired” stan-
dards are not only virtually devoid of meaning, but would also appear 
to require even less proof than a “loss of a chance.” 
 The most consistent standard consonant with the principles un-
derlying the theory of spoliation cases mandates a return to the 
original requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate an inability 
to proceed without the missing evidence. Such a standard is required 
whether one views spoliation claims in the context of either a tort ac-
tion218 or one based upon the court’s power to award sanctions.219 
 As observed by the California Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai 
Medical Center,220 tort law generally requires reasonable certainty as 
to the existence of damage, especially where there may be some un-
certainty as to the amount of the damage. In the absence of requiring 
a party to establish its inability to proceed (or defend) without the 
missing evidence, the existence of harm becomes too speculative to 
justify tort recovery.221 
 The same result is reached if one approaches spoliation as part of 
the court’s power to sanction litigants. Normally sanctions must be 
commensurate with the harm—in other words, “the punishment 
must fit the crime.” In the absence of irreparable harm, the allow-
ance of a spoliation remedy would therefore exceed compensation and 
amount to an unwarranted penalty, particularly in the absence of in-
tentional wrongdoing.223 
E.   Proof of Causation 
 Closely related to the issue of the degree of damage or prejudice 
necessary to sustain a spoliation of claim is the question of proving 
                                                                                                                    
 216. Herman, 576 So. 2d 313. In an uninsured arbitration proceeding without the 
damaged vehicle, the adverse driver was found 20% at fault. In a subsequent spoliation 
suit, aided by various evidentiary presumptions to compensate for the missing vehicle, the 
adverse driver was found to be 35% at fault. The appellate court concluded, however, that 
the increase of 75% over the original result did not constitute a significant impairment as a 
matter of law in vacating the jury’s verdict and finding for the insurer. 
 217. See, e.g., Gooding v. Univ. Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984). 
 218. Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). 
 219. Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
 220. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 513 n.3 (Cal. 1998). 
 221. Id. at 518-19; see also Bondu, 473 So. 2d at 1311. 
 222. See Harrell, 754 So. 2d at 744. 
 223. See Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 954 P.2d at 518-19. 
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causation—in other words, is it necessary for the party raising spo-
liation to go out and actually lose its case first? 
 In Bondu, the Third District held that the claim “did not arise un-
til the summary judgment adverse to her [underlying] medical mal-
practice claims was entered.”224 The court reasoned that until the un-
derlying claim was disposed of adversely to the plaintiff, there were 
no legally recognizable damages. 
 Subsequently in Miller, however, the same court retreated from 
its earlier conclusion and relying upon the California decision of 
Smith v. Superior Court225 held that “[f]or reasons of judicial econ-
omy, and to prevent piecemeal litigation, we see no reason to wait for 
a final judgment in the underlying lawsuit before bringing an action 
for the derivative claim.”226 The status of Florida law on the issue 
was cast even further in doubt when the Third District observed re-
cently that “liability for spoliation does not arise until the underlying 
action is completed.”227 
 From a conceptual standpoint, the speculation over the actual ef-
fect of the missing evidence is one of the greatest problems with the 
spoliation remedy. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in Federated Mutual Insurance Co. v. Litchfield Precision Com-
ponents, Inc.: 
[I]t is impossible to know what the destroyed evidence would have 
shown. . . . It would seem to be sheer guesswork, even presuming 
that the destroyed evidence went against the spoliator, to calculate 
what it would have contributed to the plaintiff ’s  success on the 
merits of the underlying lawsuit. Given that plaintiff has lost the 
lawsuit without the spoliated evidence, it does not follow that he 
would have won it with the evidence.228 
 Where the spoliation claimant is not required to at least go for-
ward without the evidence, the situation exists where there is specu-
lation on top of speculation as to both the outcome and the reasons 
for it. Thus, by consolidating both claims for trial purposes there is 
speculation as to both the existence and the extent of the injury. 
 An extremely analogous circumstance from which useful parallels 
can be drawn is the legal malpractice cause of action. To prove its 
damages where the claim is based upon the attorney’s handling of 
litigation matters, the client must prove the so-called “case within a 
case.” In other words, the plaintiff must prove that “but for” his at-
                                                                                                                    
 224. 473 So. 2d at 1310. 
 225. 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).  
 226. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 28 n.7 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
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1330  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1289 
 
torney’s negligence he would have prevailed in the underlying suit.229 
Under some circumstances the client must not only lose the underly-
ing suit at trial230 but also on appeal as a condition precedent to es-
tablishing his damages with legal sufficiency.231 
 The rules governing the establishment of damages and causation 
in legal malpractice claims form a useful and logical guide for deter-
mining these same issues in the spoliation context because of the 
strong analogy between the two types of actions. In the legal mal-
practice case the causation issues generally center around the ques-
tion of “but for attorney’s negligence, would the client have recov-
ered?” The exact same question applies in the spoliation context, “but 
for the missing evidence, would the plaintiff (or defendant) have 
prevailed?” It therefore makes sense to utilize a body of law 
developed over the years to deal with this issue. 
 Closely related to the issue of causation is the format to be used 
for trying the spoliation claim. Allowing consolidation with the 
underlying negligence claim, as in Brinson232 and Miller,233 creates 
both practical and conceptual problems. 
 Initially, the strategy in defending a spoliation claim is often just 
the opposite of defending a nonspoliation suit. In the spoliation ac-
tion, one key defense is generally the argument that there was suffi-
cient evidence to establish liability without the missing evidence. Ac-
cordingly, one of the ways to defend a spoliation suit is to therefore 
establish the existence of alternative evidence which is still available 
to prove the proponent’s case. 
 By consolidating the claims, however, the defendant will be un-
fairly placed in the “Catch 22” situation whereby successfully defend-
ing the spoliation action, it proves the plaintiff ’s  liability case. Thus, 
where both claims are tried together, the party defending the spolia-
tion claim is faced with the Hobson’s Choice of having to decide 
whether to produce evidence (or make arguments) in defense of the 
spoliation claim that will assist its opponent in proving its negligence 
claim. A variation of this problem was seen in the Brinson case, 
where the only way for the defendant hospital to defend the spolia-
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tion claim was to give up its statutorily created risk management 
privilege.234 
 Another potential problem arising from consolidation is the dan-
ger of duplicate damage recoveries, particularly where the missing 
evidence only impairs the plaintiff from proving his entire case and 
does not render it impossible. In Strasser, the Fourth District ob-
served: 
A party significantly impaired by the destruction of evidence may 
still be able to prevail in an action for breach of contract on the ba-
sis of existing evidence, albeit to a lesser extent and for reduced 
damages. By entitling [plaintiff] to certain evidentiary presump-
tions, the spoliation claim permits recovery for those missing dam-
ages that but for [defendant’s] destruction of evidence [plaintiff] 
otherwise would have been able to prove. The total measure of 
damages remains the same—namely, the amount of money due 
[plaintiff] under the contract. Accordingly, we find no error in 
permitting the jury to find for [plaintiff] on both the spoliation and 
breach of contract claims or in failing to provide for a separation of 
damages for each on the verdict form.235 
 While it may be relatively easy to prevent a duplication of recov-
ery in the contract setting, particularly where the damages are liqui-
dated, the same cannot be said in those tort cases where the damages 
are unliquidated. The California Supreme Court’s recognition of the 
problems arising from consolidation was one of the bases for its re-
versal of the entire Smith line of cases in Cedars-Sinai Medical Cen-
ter: 
[I]f, as plaintiff seeks to do here, a spoliation tort cause of action 
were tried jointly with the claims in the underlying action, a sig-
nificant potential for jury confusion and inconsistency would arise. 
The jury in such a case logically would first consider the underly-
ing claims. . . . 
 In doing so, the jury would consider any acts of spoliation by 
applying the evidentiary inference of Evidence Code section 413. If 
the jury rejects the spoliation victim’s position on the underlying 
claims, it has either rejected application of the evidentiary infer-
ence to the case before it (e.g., because the spoliation victim has 
not demonstrated that the spoliation was intentional), or has de-
termined that, even applying the inference in favor of the spolia-
tion victim, the other evidence in the case compels a different re-
sult. The jury would then consider and decide the spoliation tort 
claim; in doing so, however, it would necessarily be reconsidering 
its adjudication that either no intentional spoliation occurred or 
that the spoliated evidence would not have led to a different result. 
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At the least, this would be confusing to the jury; at most, it would 
lead to inconsistent results.236 
F.   Existence of Other Remedies 
 Many less drastic remedies exist under both the Florida Rules of 
Evidence and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. In Bermudez, the 
court concluded that where the party destroying the evidence acts 
willfully and maliciously, sanctions “will almost invariably” be war-
ranted, including dismissal of a claim or defense.237 Where the evi-
dence is inadvertently destroyed, however, the court held that “less 
drastic measures are ordinarily appropriate.”238 Included within the 
realm of such less drastic measures are the exclusion of experts,239 
the use of rebuttable presumptions to shift the burden of proof,240 the 
use of evidentiary inferences, and jury instructions.241 
 A good example of the type of curative practices that can be used 
is found in the Youngblood242 case where the police had failed to re-
tain semen samples used to identify the defendant in a rape prosecu-
tion. To help remedy the potential prejudice caused by the failure to 
maintain this potentially important evidence, the lower court in-
structed the jury that if the state had destroyed or lost evidence, that 
it could “infer that the true fact is against the state’s interest,”243 
while allowing the defendant to argue that the testing would have 
exculpated him. 
 Consideration must also be given to the appropriate construction 
for presumptions designed to compensate for the spoliation of evi-
dence. Some jurisdictions recognize the presumption that “but for the 
fact of the spoliation of evidence the plaintiff would have recovered in 
the pending or potential litigation.”244 Other courts, however, have 
limited the presumption to an inference that “the destroyed evidence 
would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed it.”245 
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 In circumstances where the destruction or failure to preserve the 
evidence is unintentional, this latter approach is clearly much more 
consistent with principles underlying spoliation, which are designed 
to compensate the party affected by the missing evidence to level the 
playing field. In such cases, the inference that the evidence in ques-
tion would have been adverse to that party does not replace the par-
ties’ need to produce sufficient evidence of the material facts neces-
sary to establish the elements of the specific cause of action, nor does 
it shift the burden of proof.246 Thus, in these circumstances, the party 
receiving the benefit of the spoliation inference is in no better or 
worse situation than they would be if the evidence had been pre-
served. 
 The argument that a stronger inference would be appropriate 
where the spoliation is intentional is a valid one. Where a party in-
tentionally destroys evidence to secure a litigation advantage, the 
calculated nature of its conduct gives rise to the strong inference that 
the party itself concluded that the evidence would be so harmful to 
its case that it was worth the risk of getting caught to destroy it. 
Therefore, a much stronger inference is created by such conduct. 
 In such cases, a reasonable argument can also be made that it is 
necessary not only to place the injured party in the same position it 
would have been in absent the loss of the evidence, but also to punish 
the wrongdoer.247 The need for such a sanction is not only necessary 
to punish the party for its wrongful conduct, but also to act as a de-
terrent against similar conduct in the future.248 
G.   Other Factors 
1.   Due Diligence 
 While most courts have weighed the diligence of the party seeking 
to invoke spoliation remedies as part of their prejudice analysis,249 
some courts have treated such diligence as a separate element, that 
must be proved as part of the spoliation claim.250 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court has gone so far as to require “[i]f the spoliated evi-
dence was necessary for inspection or testing, the party who seeks 
the inference must have taken all appropriate means to have the 
evidence produced. This may include, if necessary, an attempt to ob-
tain a court-ordered inspection.”251 
                                                                                                                    
 246. See, e.g., Beers, 675 A.2d at 833; DeLaughter, 601 So. 2d at 822-23. 
 247. See, e.g., Tramel v. Bass, 672 So. 2d 78, 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See, e.g., North v. Altech Yachts, Inc., No. 4D01-225, 2002 WL 54512 (Fla. 4th 
DCA Jan. 16, 2002); Harrell v. Mayberry, 754 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). 
 250. See, e.g., Beers, 675 A.2d at 833. 
 251. Id. (citations omitted). 
1334  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1289 
 
2.   Control of Evidence at Time of Loss 
 Evidence which is destroyed must be within the possession or con-
trol of the party against which spoliation is asserted. Accordingly, a 
claim will not lie against a party where the evidence is disposed of by 
an unrelated third party over which it had no control.252 
 An analogous rationale was followed in Gentry v. Toyota Motor 
Corp.,253 where the plaintiff ’s  expert removed a piece of the plain-
tiff ’s  car with a hacksaw as part of his evaluation for purposes of 
supporting the plaintiff ’s  products liability action against the manu-
facturer. Because the expert had acted without the plaintiff ’s  knowl-
edge or authorization, the court refused to charge the plaintiff with 
responsibility for his actions. 
 The issue of control also arose in another context in Valcin,254 in 
which a hospital was held responsible for a surgeon’s failure to pre-
pare a statutorily required operative report. Although the court 
noted that there was generally an independent contractor relation-
ship between doctors and hospitals that would not give rise to the 
hospital’s liability for spoliation, where there was an employer-
employee relationship the hospital would be held vicariously respon-
sible for the surgeon’s actions. 
3.   Notice 
 A number of courts have also wrestled with the issue of the suffi-
ciency of notice of the potential litigation that is necessary to give 
rise to a duty to preserve potential evidence. In American Family In-
surance Co. v. Village Pontiac GMC, Inc.,255 the court concluded that 
a single call from the plaintiff to a manufacturer’s local dealer advis-
ing it of an accident with its product was not sufficient to place the 
manufacturer on notice of the need to immediately investigate the 
cause of the accident and to anticipate a potential products liability 
suit. Likewise, in Dunham v. Condor Insurance Co.,256 a California 
appellate court held that the insurer in a motor vehicle accident had 
no duty to preserve an allegedly defective truck part for a subsequent 
products liability suit where the plaintiffs had made no request for 
its retention. 
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 Recently, the Supreme Court of Alabama has also has reached a 
similar conclusion in Smith v. Atkinson,257 holding: 
[A] third party’s constructive notice of a pending or potential ac-
tion is not sufficient to force upon the third party the duty to pre-
serve evidence. “Limiting the usual duty in third-party negligent 
spoliation to an agreement to preserve, or a voluntary undertaking 
with reasonable and detrimental reliance, or a specific request, 
ensures that such a spoliator has acted wrongfully in a specifically 
identified way.”258 
 Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal took a much more ex-
pansive view of the type of notice necessary to create such a duty, 
however, in Builder’s Square, Inc. v. Shaw,259 which arose from an 
employee’s fall from a ladder claimed to be defective. Section 440.39, 
Florida Statutes,260 imposes a duty upon an employer to cooperate 
with an employee in maintaining a claim against third parties. The 
courts have construed this obligation to include the duty to preserve 
evidence critical to the suit.261 
 In this particular case, the employer had notice within three days 
after the incident that the employee had been injured on one of the 
twelve ladders that had been maintained on the premises. Although 
the employer did not have actual notice as to which of the twelve 
ladders had been specifically involved in the accident, the court con-
cluded “while actual notice of identified evidence is the clearest form, 
an employer can similarly be charged with notice when the circum-
stances are such that it should have known that certain evidence 
could conceivably be critical to an employee’s claim.”262 As a result, 
the court concluded that the employer had a duty to consult with its 
employee before disposing of any of its ladders. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 The threshold issue that courts must address is whether a sepa-
rate cause of action for spoliation of evidence will be recognized. 
Some jurisdictions have concluded that a separate cause of action is 
appropriate, while others instead have opted to utilize existing alter-
native remedies. In either circumstance, however, logic would dictate 
that the same rules and guidelines should be applicable as a requi-
site to applying a spoliation remedy, whether it be under the guise of 
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a tort claim or through one of the other alternatives available to 
courts. 
 First and foremost, there must be a duty to preserve or maintain 
the evidence. In the absence of such a duty, a party who fails to pre-
serve or which disposes of evidence is not a wrongdoer, because indi-
viduals have an absolute right to preserve or destroy their own prop-
erty as they see fit in the absence of a legal prohibition.263 Such a 
duty must be a requisite regardless of whether the remedy under 
question is potential liability under tort or merely a sanction in pend-
ing litigation. In either case, the parties legal rights are being af-
fected and therefore must be subject to the same due process protec-
tions. 
 Secondly, the precise spoliation remedy permitted should also be 
dependent upon the degree of culpability or scienter of the party dis-
posing or failing to preserve the evidence in question. In the absence 
of willful and intentional conduct specifically designed to thwart an-
other party’s legal rights or to obtain an improper advantage in legal 
proceedings, the guiding principle behind the remedy should be lim-
ited to compensating the injured party for the missing evidence so 
that it would be in the same position had the evidence been main-
tained. As such, the victim of an unintentional spoliation is not enti-
tled to being placed in a superior position, nor is the nonmalicious 
spoliator subject to a penalty in the form of incurring a greater legal 
burden. 
 Where the spoliator’s actions are intentional or malicious in na-
ture, however, other policy considerations come into play. Under 
these circumstances, a much stronger inference arises from such cal-
culated conduct and it is also appropriate to punish the wrongdoer 
for its conduct and to seek to deter others from similar actions. 
 In many ways, focusing the scope of the remedy upon the degree 
of intent or scienter of the spoliating party is similar to the concep-
tual framework underlying the distinctions between compensatory 
and punitive damages in tort law. In the tort context, an actor whose 
conduct negligently injures another is liable only for compensatory 
damages designed to place that individual back in the same position 
it would have been in but for the negligent infliction of the injury. 
Where, however, a defendant is guilty of intentional, willful or reck-
less misconduct, punitive damages are allowed to both punish the 
wrongdoer and to deter others from similar conduct. This same anal-
ogy applies equally to spoliation remedies, whether they be in the 
form of a separate cause of action or one of the alternative remedies. 
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 Third, spoliation remedies should only come into play, particularly 
when dealing with unintentional and nonmalicious actions, when 
there has been a significant and measurable harm created by the loss 
of the evidence. Early cases limited spoliation remedies to those cir-
cumstances where the missing evidence literally prevented the plain-
tiff from establishing a prima facie case.264 By its very nature, the ef-
fects of spoliation are generally speculative. As observed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Youngblood,265 when attempting to 
determine the effect of missing evidence, “courts face the treacherous 
task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown 
and, very often, disputed.” Therefore, regardless of what type of spo-
liation remedy is under consideration, a high threshold of injury is 
important to justify the necessary degree of speculation inherent in 
such claims. Once again, however, where the actions of the spoliator 
are intentional, a much lower threshold is required. 
 Finally, in considering spoliation remedies, courts should also re-
quire the use of the least drastic alternative, particularly where the 
spoliation is unintentional in nature. Discovery and evidentiary rules 
generally provide courts with considerable discretion in fashioning 
sanctions and remedies for discovery problems and abuses. These 
rules are designed to cause the least damage to the parties’ right to 
due process and trial by jury. In creating spoliation remedies, courts 
should always be cognizant of the parties’ constitutional rights to due 
process, trial by jury, and the lawful use of their property. 
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